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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past 40 years, courts and employers have struggled to define the 
meaning of Title VII’s implicit promise to provide and protect the employment 
opportunities available to certain classes of individuals.  Pregnancy-based 
discrimination has posed an especially difficult challenge.  Unlike other proscribed 
forms of discrimination, the unfair treatment of pregnant employees presents a 
unique analytical wrinkle: only women become pregnant, and women’s ability to 
work is affected by pregnancy (including childbirth and/or related medical 
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conditions).  At a minimum, women must take a leave of absence to give birth and 
recover, physically, from childbirth.  A woman with a more physical job — such as a 
police officer — will undeniably find that her pregnancy complicates her ability to 
perform that job.1  How then do we define and enforce Title VII’s promise of equal 
treatment and equal opportunity?  If a pregnant woman cannot in fact perform her 
job duties while pregnant, how do employers ensure equal treatment of these 
temporarily disabled employees? 
In the past, employers –– and courts –– have cited the physical differences 
between men and women to justify treating female employees differently than their 
male counterparts.  Indeed, case law prior to the passage of Title VII is replete with 
examples of court-sanctioned disparate treatment of the sexes based on this rationale.  
For example, in 1908, the Supreme Court penned the following opinion in Muller v. 
Oregon: 
That woman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal 
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is 
obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon 
her. Even when they are not, by abundant testimony of the medical 
fraternity continuance for a long time on her feet at work, repeating this 
from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon the body, and, as healthy 
mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well–being of 
woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve 
the strength and vigor of the race. . . . [The Mother] is properly placed in 
a class by herself, and legislation designed for her protection may be 
sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men, and could 
not be sustained. . . . This difference justifies a difference in legislation.2 
As evidenced by the above provision, according to the Supreme Court in 1908, a 
woman’s innate physical inferiority justified both her protection but also her 
disparate treatment.  Thus, first and foremost, a woman was defined by her 
childbearing capabilities. Further, according to the Court, it was “an object of public 
interest” that pregnant women receive particular, protectionist care –– not just for her 
own sake, but also “to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.”3 The maintenance 
of a woman’s health and childbearing capabilities, therefore, was not just her 
concern, but a societal one as well.4 
                                                                
1See, e.g., Tysinger v. Police Dep’t of City of Zanesville, 463 F.3d 569, 570–71 (6th Cir. 
2006) (holding that police department had no obligation to provide light duty assignment to 
pregnant police officer, despite pregnancy-related work restriction prescribed by her doctor).   
2Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421–23 (1908) (holding that the government’s interest in 
protecting women outweighed the “right” of women to have free contracts; upholding an 
Oregon law restricting the number of hours women could work in factories).   
3Id. at 421.   
4Similar concerns are expressed through reports and studies conducted during this period.  
See, e.g., Consumers' League of New York City, Behind the Scenes in a Restaurant, 1916, at 
6, available at http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/2573413?n=12&s=4 [hereinafter 
Consumers’ League Report].  For example, research into women’s working conditions in 
restaurants in New York City during the early 1900s led the Consumers’ League of New York 
City to conclude that restaurant-related occupations presented “physical dangers” to the 
reproductive capacities of young women:  “Medical authorities have pointed out the serious 
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In 1964, with its passage of the Civil Rights Act, Congress proposed to change 
the face of the American workforce “to achieve equality of employment 
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an 
identifiable group of white employees over other employees.”5  In that legislation, 
Congress provided a broad legal approach with which to address a complex social 
harm.   
Among other things, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) provided that 
it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .”  With the passage of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (“PDA”) nearly 15 years later, Congress 
made clear that Title VII’s prohibition against sex-based discrimination included 
pregnancy discrimination.   
Although a century has now passed since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Muller, do remnants of the patriarchal views evidenced by that Court still survive 
today?  Women are now more readily welcomed into the workplace, but do work-life 
balance challenges and perceptions of women’s role as primary caretaker impede 
their ultimate professional success?   Does a perception that a female employee will 
likely opt-out of the workforce to care for her family and concerns about pregnancy-
related leave negatively impact female hireability?  Are women’s post-hire job 
performance evaluations and perceived promotability further affected by such 
concerns?  More than 40 years after Congressional enactment of Title VII, and 30 
                                                          
results that follow the strain of continued standing and over-work of young girls;” “‘there is a 
definite hazard to the child-bearing capacity of women.  This is of vital consequence to society 
as a whole.’”  See id. at 6–7 (quoting a doctor in support of the proposition).  See also id. at 
Appendix II, at 34 (setting forth Extracts from a Tentative Report on the Physical Condition of 
Women Employees in Restaurants Conducted by the Occupational Clinic of the Health 
Department of the State of New York, by Louis I. Harris, Chief, Division of Indus. Hygiene), 
available at http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/2573413?n=50&s=4 (concluding that “[t]he 
effect of work that requires standing and running about while carrying loads for many hours 
during the day will be particularly marked upon the generative organs of the woman” and 
“[t]he influence of the work in this particular, which we were unfortunately unable to study, 
because of the opposition that would inevitably arouse, leads me to believe that from this 
standpoint alone, there is a definite hazard to the child-bearing capacity of the woman.”).  
Note that the Consumers’ League of New York City was a group founded to advocate on 
working women’s behalf.  “The Consumers’ League of New York City was formed in 1891 as 
a result of a report made in 1890 by Alice Woodbridge, secretary of the Working Women’s 
Society, the forerunner of the Women’s Trade Union League. This report enumerated the 
deplorable working conditions and long hours under which women engaged in the retail trade 
had to work.”  Kheel Center for Labor-Management Documentation and Archives, Cornell 
University Library, Guide to the Consumers’ League of New York City Records, (200), at 
http://rmc.library.cornell.edu/EAD/htmldocs/KCL05307.html.  According to one source, 
“[r]eports and agitations of the league were probably more influential in the field of legislation 
than in any other way and effected the passage, enforcement, and defense of laws having to do 
with safety, sanitation, night work, maximum hours, child labor, minimum wages, social 
security, and fair employment practices.”  See id.  
5Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (articulating “the objective of 
Congress in the enactment of Title VII;” “[u]nder the Act, practices, procedures, or tests 
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate 
to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”). 
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years after the PDA, do modern workplace realities measure up to the lofty goals 
underlying that legislation?  Today, there is no question that pregnancy-related 
discrimination is illegal, but we are still working through the ultimate contours and 
effect of that prohibition to this day.   
Accordingly, the focus of this Article is on the legal and social evolution 
resulting from the Civil Rights Act’s prohibition of sex-based discrimination –– and, 
in particular, pregnancy-related discrimination –– in the workplace.  Section II of 
this Article details the reluctance with which courts and employers initially extended 
workplace rights to women.  Sections III and IV discuss Title VII’s prohibition 
against “sex” discrimination and initial court hesitation to interpret that prohibition to 
include employees discriminated against on the basis of pregnancy.  Sections V and 
VI provide an overview of federal and Ohio law granting pregnancy-related rights to 
women, including the PDA, the Family Medical Leave Act and Ohio Revised Code 
Chapter 4112.  Section VII of this Article examines problematic pregnancy-related 
workplace perceptions, including how the modern woman’s entry and acceptance 
into the workplace remains complicated by traditional notions of proper female roles.  
Finally, this Article asks whether stereotypical perceptions of what characteristics 
comprise the “ideal worker” (e.g., office “face-time”) continue to feed negative 
perceptions of working mothers, slow their workplace advancement and ultimately 
contribute to many mothers’ decisions to simply “opt-out” of their careers. Section 
VIII contains suggestions for legislative and corporate policy changes that speak to 
modern realities regarding pregnancy discrimination, specifically, and female 
workplace advancement, more generally.   
II.  THE SHORT-LIVED, LARGE-SCALE SHIFT FROM UNPAID HOUSEHOLD LABOR TO 
PAID WORKFORCE ENTRY DURING WORLD WAR II 
The country’s workforce needs during World War II created significant new 
employment opportunities for American women.  Although women have always 
“worked,” much of that work was completed in their homes––i.e., unpaid household 
labor.6  Other exceptions included the service industry and “pink collar” positions 
filled by lower-class women.7  For example, women worked in restaurants as 
“dishwashers, silver cleaners, tray girls, cashiers, laundry workers and pantry 
hands,”8 as nurses, bookkeepers, stenographers, clerical workers9 or secretaries.  
                                                                
6See National Park Service, Rosie the Riveter:  Women Working During World War II, at 
http://www.nps.gov/pwro/collection/website/worked.htm (noting, for example, housework or 
work on the family farm) [hereinafter National Park Service, World War II Online Exhibit].   
7Consumers’ League Report, supra note 4,  11, at http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/ 
view/2573413?n=19&s=4&imagesize=1200&rotation=0 (noting that, in 1916, New York City 
restaurant workers were largely recruited from the “European peasant class”). 
8See Consumers’ League Report, supra note 4,  6, at http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/ 
2573413?n=12&s=4.  Pursuant to this study, the Consumers’ League interviewed 1,017 
women in New York City to establish the prevailing conditions of labor in restaurants in New 
York City.  Id. at 3.  Among other things, the survey noted that “[a]n outstanding feature of 
restaurant work is the presence in this occupation of a very large proportion of girls and young 
women.”  Id. at 6.  A quarter of the workers were under 21 and two-thirds under 30 years old.  
Id. The survey also noted the “physical dangers” of this occupation for young women: 
“Medical authorities have pointed out the serious results that follow the strain of continued 
standing and over-work of young girls;” “‘there is a definite hazard to the child-bearing 
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These women, however, were typically paid very little and were certainly paid less 
than men who worked identical jobs.10 
By and large, prior to the war, women were not considered for, or welcome to 
pursue positions of significance among the paid American workforce.  This all 
changed with the entry of the United States into the Second World War.  Wartime 
production created millions of new jobs, while, at the same time, the draft caused the 
removal of increasing numbers of men from the workforce each year.11  The need 
arose for a new source of labor.  In response, government agencies, businesses, and 
private organizations called for the mobilization of a female workforce.12  
Propaganda in the form of posters, movies and advertisements called for women to 
support the war effort by filling the jobs left empty by men departing overseas.13 
Women responded to this need by entering the workforce in droves.  Specifically, 
from March 1941 to August 1944, “the number of women employed in the labor 
                                                          
capacity of women.  This is of vital consequence to society as a whole.’”  See id. at 6–7 
(quoting a doctor in support of the proposition).  Further, the survey reported that after a year 
or two of “the hard labor required in a restaurant kitchen,” many of the working women lost 
“much of their sturdiness,” the “color and brightness are gone from their faces, and they have 
become pale and listless.  A curiously dull, passive look is characteristic of many of them.”  
Id. at 8.   
9See Amy G. Maher, U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Women’s Bureau, Bulletin of the 
Woman’s Bureau No. 95, Bookkeepers, Office Clerks and Stenographs in Ohio: 1914 to 1929, 
United States Government Printing Office (Washington 1932), at http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/ 
pds/view/2574474?n=3&s=4 (“report on the earnings and trends of employment of office 
workers in the State of Ohio over a period of 16 years”) [hereinafter U.S. Women’s Bureau 
1932 Bulletin].  “In 1939, almost three-tenths of all women employed in Ohio were” clerical 
employees.  See id., at V (Letter of Transmittal from Mary Anderson, Director of the U.S. 
Department of Labor, Women’s Bureau,  Washington, February 26, 1932).   
10See e.g., id. at 2, at http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/2574474?n=3&s=4.  For 
example, in 1929, male clerical workers earned a median of $38.57 per week, whereas female 
clerical workers earned a median wage of $22.40 per week.  See id.   
11See National Park Service, World War II Online Exhibit, supra note 6, at 
http://www.nps.gov/pwro/collection/website/rosie.htm (“Before the United States entered 
World War II, several companies already had contracts with the government to produce war 
equipment for the Allies. Almost overnight the United States entered the war and war 
production had to increase dramatically in a short amount of time. Auto factories were 
converted to build airplanes, shipyards were expanded, and new factories were built, and all 
these facilities needed workers. At first companies did not think that there would be a labor 
shortage so they did not take the idea of hiring women seriously. Eventually, women were 
needed because companies were signing large, lucrative contracts with the government just as 
all the men were leaving for the service.”) 
12Melissa E. Murray, Whatever Happened to G.I. Jane?: Citizenship, Gender, and Social 
Policy in the Postwar Era, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 91, 107 (2002) (Government, public and 
private organizations expressly recognized that “‘There is an acute shortage of workers . . .  .  
Practically all available man-power has been exhausted, so the solving of the problem rests 
with the women.’”).   
13Id.  For example, “a Mobile Press Register advertisement commissioned by ‘patriotic’ 
businesses, in conjunction with the War Manpower Commission, implored women to lend 
their labor to the war effort.”  Id.   
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force swelled from 10.8 million . . . to 18 million . . . .”14  For the first time in this 
country’s history, women dominated the American workforce.15  By war’s end, 
[women] would represent a record 57 percent of all employed people.16   
Along with the altered face of the country’s workforce came shifting views of 
appropriate female roles.  The labor shortage that occurred during World War II 
required women to work jobs traditionally reserved for men, including “millions of 
high-paying industrial jobs.”17  Further, the government began providing benefits to 
aid the female transition into the workplace, including “day care and household 
assistance.”18  
Far from being shunned for acting outside of their perceived gender roles, women 
who answered the calls for workforce entry were publicly hailed as heroes.  Federal 
brochures saluted the hardy working woman as a true patriot.  “Strong women,” such 
as Rosie the Riveter, “became cultural icons.”19   
Many women accepted this change as permanent and embraced their redefined 
role.  “Once at work, [women] discovered the nonmaterial benefits of working, like 
learning new skills, contributing to the public good, and proving themselves in jobs 
once thought of as only men’s work.”20  Accordingly, many women indicated their 
intent to keep their jobs after the men returned from overseas:  “Seventy-five percent 
reported in government surveys that they were going to keep their jobs after the 
war.”21  “The old theory that a woman’s place is in the home no longer exists,” 
declared a female steelworker during that WWII-era survey.  “Those days are gone 
forever.”22  This, of course, proved untrue.   
                                                                
14Id. at 108.  
15SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 51 
(1991).   
16See id.   
17See id. 
18See id.; see also Marlys Ann Boschee, Ed. D. and Geralyn M. Jacobs, Ed.D., Child Care 
in the United States: Yesterday and Today, National Network for Child Care, at 
http://www.nncc.org/Choose.Quality.Care 
/ccyesterd.html (“During World War II, the Federal Government sponsored day care for 
400,000 preschool children. Again, this was not done because Congress perceived day care to 
be beneficial for children, but because the mothers of these children were needed to work in 
industries producing war materials. . . . [A]fter the war, the Federal government abdicated all 
support for day care and instructed women to quit working, go home, and take care of their 
children.”).   
19FALUDI, supra note 15, at 51. 
20See National Park Service, World War II Online Exhibit, supra note 6, at 
http://www.nps.gov/pwro/collection/website/rosie.htm. 
21FALUDI, supra note 15, at 51. 
22Id. at 47.  Of course, this was not the first time in history that a woman maintained false 
hopes of women’s liberation.  For example, “‘[a]t the opening of the twentieth century,” Ida 
Husted Harper proclaimed that “the female condition was ‘completely transformed in most 
respects.’”  Id.  
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The acceptance of female entry into the workplace was short-lived.  From the 
very start of the war women were only viewed as a temporary solution to the 
workplace vacancies left by men sent overseas.23  “Mainstream society accepted 
temporary changes brought about by a war, but considered them undesirable on a 
permanent basis.”24   
By the end of the war, “efforts by industry, government, and the media 
converged to force a female retreat” from the workplace.25  With the return of the 
men from war, women were no longer needed -- nor wanted -- at work.  Indeed, 
public and private entities and employers went so far as to enact rules designed to 
hasten female retreat to their homes.  For example, employers revived rules that 
prohibited the hiring of married women and imposed caps on female workers’ 
salaries.26  Further, “the federal government proposed giving unemployment 
assistance only to men, shut down its day care services, and defended the ‘right’ of 
veterans to displace working women.”27   
Attitudes towards women in the workforce also changed.  No longer hailed as 
heroes, “[e]mployers who had [once] applauded women’s work during the war now 
accused working women of incompetence or ‘bad attitudes’ — and laid them off at 
rates that were seventy-five percent higher than men’s.”28  Thus, just as swiftly as 
women were swept into the workforce, they found themselves pushed back out 
again.   
During this time, however, an important shift in perception may have occurred in 
the collective female psyche.  Among the women disappointed by being forced out 
of the workforce after the war were the daughters of those women who, during the 
wartime, formed a belief that they, too, desired a career.  In a survey conducted by 
Senior Scholastic around this time, about “88 percent of the 33,000 girls polled . . . 
said they wanted a career.”29  More and more women began to envision change.      
III.  1964 -- THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT PROHIBITS WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION ON THE 
BASIS OF “SEX” 
Over its relatively short lifetime, Title VII has had an important influence on the 
workplace opportunities and the conditions of employment available to women.  For 
many years after World War II, employment opportunities for women remained 
                                                                
23See National Park Service, World War II Online Exhibit, supra note 6, at 
http://www.nps.gov/pwro/collection/website/propaganda.htm (“The propaganda campaigns 
used during the war never had any intention of bringing about permanent changes in women’s 
place in society. Rather, the government used them to fill temporary labor shortages with 
women workers.”). 
24See id., at http://www.nps.gov/pwro/collection/website/rosie.htm. 
25FALUDI, supra note 15, at 51 (quoting the response of a female steelworker to a 
government survey at the end of World War II). 
26Id. at 52. 
27Id. at 51.   
28Id. at 52.  
29Id. at 51.   
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scarce, restricted primarily to “lower-paid clerical and administrative positions.”30  
Furthermore, employers made jobs outside the home “as inequitable and intolerable 
as possible, pushing women into the worst occupations, paying them the lowest 
wages, laying them off first and promoting them last, refusing to offer child care or 
family leave, and subjecting them to harassment.”31  No longer “needed” in the 
workforce, women were once again treated as unwanted interlopers.   
“In the 1950s and 1960s, a wave of protest aimed at ending discrimination and 
segregation against African Americans, especially in the South, brought civil rights 
to the forefront of national debate.”32  On Feb. 28, 1963, President John F. Kennedy 
issued a “Special Message on Civil Rights” press release and announced his plan for 
civil rights legislation33 and, by the spring of 1963, President John F. Kennedy had 
submitted a draft civil rights bill to Congress.34   
There is little or no evidence, however, that President Kennedy or Congress 
initially intended to include women among Title VII’s classes of protected 
individuals.35  The draft civil rights bill initially submitted by President Kennedy to 
                                                                
30Id. at 53. 
31Id. at 55. 
32Congress and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/ 
treasures_of_congress/text/page24_text.html (n.d). 
33Office of the White House Press Secretary, Press Release, Feb. 28, 1963, available at 
http://www.congresslink.org/print_basics_histmats_civilrights64_doc1.htm (Everett M. 
Dirksen Papers. Working Papers, f. 241. The Dirksen Congressional Center, Pekin, IL). 
34Everett M. Dirksen: Supporting Cloture on the Civil Rights Bill, June 10, 1964, 
available at http://www.congresslink.org/print_basics_histmats_civilrights64_doc9.htm (From 
Senator Robert C. Byrd's The Senate, 1789-1989, Classic Speeches, 1830-1993, (Vol.3) pp. 
701–07. Courtesy of the U. S. Senate Historical Office).   
35This is not to say that there was no concern for working women’s rights during this time.  
On June 10, 1963, for example, President Kennedy signed the Equal Pay Act into law and 
made the following remarks: 
I am delighted today to approve the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which prohibits arbitrary 
discrimination against women in the payment of wages. This act represents many 
years of effort by labor, management, and several private organizations unassociated 
with labor or management, to call attention to the unconscionable practice of paying 
female employees less wages than male employees for the same job. This measure 
adds to our laws another structure basic to democracy. It will add protection at the 
working place to the women, the same rights . . .  
While much remains to be done to achieve full equality of economic opportunity--for 
the average woman worker earns only 60 percent of the average wage for men--this 
legislation is a significant step forward.  
Our economy today depends upon women in the labor force. One out of three workers 
is a woman. Today, there are almost 25 million women employed, and their number is 
rising faster than the number of men in the labor force.  
It is extremely important that adequate provision be made for reasonable levels of 
income to them, for the care of the children which they must leave at home or in 
school, and for protection of the family unit. One of the prime objectives of the 
Commission on the Status of Women, which I appointed 18 months ago, is to develop 
a program to accomplish these purposes.  
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Congress did not include “sex” among its protected characteristics.36  Also, 
legislative history reveals that there was little debate in Congress preceding the 
addition of “sex” to the civil rights legislation.  Indeed, according to some accounts, 
the extension of workplace equality rights to women instead resulted from the 
political posturing of a man who hoped that prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of sex would defeat the passage of Title VII.37  Specifically, on February 8, 1964, 
just two days before the bill that would later become Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
moved from the House to the Senate, Representative Howard W. Smith, a vocal 
opponent of the Civil Rights Act, proposed that discrimination on the basis of “sex” 
be added to the bill.38  If killing the bill was his goal, however, Representative Smith 
failed.  The bill passed in both the House and Senate, and on July 2, 1964, President 
Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act into law, including Title VII’s prohibition 
against sex-based discrimination.   
IV.  BEFORE 1978 -- COURTS ARE DIVIDED AS TO WHETHER PREGNANCY-BASED 
DISCRIMINATION FALLS WITHIN THE DEFINITIONAL AMBIT OF PROSCRIBED 
“DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX;” EARLY SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
HOLDS THAT IT IS NOT INCLUDED 
From the very start, courts struggled to define sex-based discrimination.  
According to one court in 1975, the last-minute addition of “sex” to the Civil Rights 
Act meant that “Congress in all probability did not intend for its proscription of 
sexual discrimination to have significant and sweeping implications.”39  According to 
that court, “fundamental rights,” such as “the right to have children or to marry,” did 
not include the right to equal opportunity in the workplace, to the extent that the 
provision of that opportunity might interfere “with the manner in which an employer 
exercises his judgment as to the way to operate a business.40   
Additionally, for many years following the passage of Title VII, it remained 
unclear whether Congress intended for the proscription against sex-based 
                                                          
Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, John F. Kennedy: Remarks Upon Signing 
the Equal Pay Act, (June 10, 1963), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 
index.php?pid=9267. 
36See National Partnership for Women & Families, Women at Work:  Looking Behind the 
Numbers 40 Years After the Civil Rights Act of 1964, executive summary (July 2004), 
available at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/portals_p3_library_Civil 
RightsAffAction_WomenAtWorkCRA40.pdf?docID=590 [hereinafter Women at Work].   
37See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The 
amendment adding ‘sex’ . . . was introduced by Representative Howard Smith of Virginia, 
who . . . was accused by some of wishing to sabotage its passage by his proposal of the ‘sex’ 
amendment.”).   
38See Women at Work, supra note 36.  Note that the late timing of the addition of “sex” to 
Title VII precluded detailed debate by Congress on the issue of what, precisely, Congress 
intended when it prohibited “discrimination on the basis of sex.” Id. Thus, Congress created 
very little legislative history to inform court interpretation of sex-based discrimination. Id. 
Courts were instead left to define the parameters of illegal sex-based discrimination without 
the guideposts of legislative intent that accompanied the statute’s other prohibitions. Id.   
39Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090. 
40Id. at 1091. 
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discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and pregnancy-
related conditions.  In particular, public and private entities remained widely divided 
regarding the issue of whether Title VII’s prohibition against sex-based 
discrimination included women who could not perform their jobs during their 
pregnancy.   
Courts and employers also struggled with the impact of Title VII on the provision 
of employee benefits.  On the one hand, in 1972, the EEOC issued guidelines that 
interpreted Title VII coverage to include “disabilities caused or contributed to by 
pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth, and recovery” and advised that 
“[employment benefits] shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth 
on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary 
disabilities.”41  On the other hand, many employers refused to extend employment 
policies and benefits such as temporary disability, paid sick leave and accumulated 
seniority status to women who took a pregnancy-related leave of absence.42  For 
example, in the early 1970s, General Electric argued before the U.S. Supreme Court 
that the majority of U.S. employers did not provide their employees with disability 
coverage for pregnancy-related conditions.  According to General Electric:   
[As of 1974,] approximately 40 per cent of the work force in the United 
States under 65, or some 32,168,000 employees, is covered by sickness 
and accident disability insurance.  The benefit periods of this insurance 
vary: about 45 per cent of the plans provide 13 weeks benefit coverage; 50 
per cent provide coverage for 26 weeks; and only 5 per cent provide 
coverage for 52 weeks.  Only about 42.6 per cent of these plans, covering 
about 13,500,000 employees, provide a pregnancy benefit, and such 
coverage . . . is ‘almost always . . . limited to six weeks . . . .’43   
Thus, for a decade after the passage of the Civil Rights Act, the majority of 
employment policies reflected a belief by employers that pregnancy-based 
discrimination did not fall within the scope of sex-based discrimination proscribed 
by Title VII and that it was therefore not illegal to exclude female-specific benefits 
from health benefit plans.  The United States Supreme Court in General Electric Co. 
v. Gilbert agreed.  In that case, the Supreme Court first addressed whether an 
employment benefit plan that excluded pregnancy-related benefits violated Title 
VII.44  The case involved a challenge brought by a class of female General Electric 
employees against the company’s disability plan which excluded disabilities arising 
from pregnancy from its coverage, despite providing otherwise broad coverage for 
all other “non-occupational sickness and accident benefits.”45  Specifically, at issue 
                                                                
4129 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975). 
42See Brief for General Electric Co. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 23, 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 94 S.Ct. 2485, (1974) (citation omitted). 
43Id. at 24 (citation omitted).  
44429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
45Id. at 127–28.  The class consisted of female employees that became pregnant in 1971 or 
1972, who presented claims under the company’s disability plan “to cover the period while 
absent from work as a result of the pregnancy.  These claims were routinely denied on the 
ground that the Plan did not provide disability-benefit payments for any absence due to 
pregnancy.”  Id. at 129. 
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in Gilbert was whether an employment practice that offered unequal benefits based 
on an employee’s pregnancy or pregnancy-related condition constituted a form of 
“sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.”46 
To defend its exclusion of pregnancy-related conditions from coverage by its 
employee disability plan, GE employed a “cost differential defense.”47  In particular, 
GE presented evidence that (1) the cost of providing disability coverage to each 
female GE employee was equal to, if not greater than, the cost of coverage per male, 
and (2) pregnancy-related disability coverage would substantially increase the cost of 
its disability insurance plan.48   
The district and appellate courts rejected GE’s cost-differential defense, 
concluding that “[i]f Title VII intends to sexually equalize employment opportunity, 
there must be one exception to the cost differential defense.”49   Accordingly, the 
district court concluded that GE’s disability plan, which provided general coverage 
for employee disabilities except when those disabilities resulted from pregnancy, 
discriminated on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.50  By a two-to-one margin, 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed that decision.51 
The Supreme Court in Gilbert, however, reversed the lower court’s decision and 
held that employers could legally exclude pregnancy and pregnancy-related 
conditions from employee sickness and accident benefits plans.52  In reaching that 
conclusion, the Gilbert court focused its analysis on a concept not addressed by the 
lower courts:  whether an employment policy that had a discriminatory effect only on 
employees who became pregnant constituted a gender-based discriminatory practice.  
After framing the issue as such, the Court rejected the notion that a distinction based 
on pregnancy is synonymous with sex-based discrimination.53  More specifically, the 
majority reasoned that the differential treatment of pregnancy distinguished not 
between men and women, but between pregnant women and non-pregnant persons of 
both sexes.54  Thus, the fact that only women could become pregnant did not itself 
support a finding that “the exclusion of pregnancy benefits is a mere ‘pretex[t] designed 
to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other.’”55  
Accordingly, the Gilbert court held that the disability insurance plan provided by GE 
                                                                
46Id. at 127–28. 
47Id. at 132. 
48Id. at 132 (citing Gilbert, 375 F. Supp. at 383).   
49Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 132 (quoting Gilbert, 375 F. Supp. at 383).  In 1982, 
Congress expressly precluded employer use of a cost differential defense with its enactment of 
29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e) (1982) (“It shall not be a defense under Title VII to a charge of sex 
discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with respect to one sex than 
the other.”). 
50375 F. Supp. at 385–86. 
51Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 668 (4th Cir. 1975). 
52General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
53See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 133–40. 
54Id. at 135. 
55Id. at 135, 136 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974)). 
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afforded equal benefits to male and female employees, notwithstanding the exclusion 
of pregnancy-related disabilities: 
The Plan, in effect . . . is nothing more than an insurance package, which 
covers some risks, but excludes others . . . .  The “package” going to . . . 
General Electric’s male and female employees covers exactly the same 
categories of risk, and is facially nondiscriminatory in the sense that 
“[t]here is no risk from which men are protected and women are not.  
Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men are 
not.” . . . As there is no proof that the package is in fact worth more to 
men than women, it is impossible to find any gender–based discriminatory 
effect in this scheme simply because women disabled as a result of 
pregnancy do not receive benefits . . . . For all that appears, pregnancy–
related disabilities constitute an additional risk, unique to women, and the 
failure to compensate them for this risk does not destroy the presumed 
parity of the benefits, accruing to men and women alike, which results 
from the facially evenhanded inclusion of risks.56 
With this rationale, the Court acknowledged that pregnancy is a condition unique 
to women, but found this unique condition to be something “extra.”  Thus, the 
provision of pregnancy disability benefits did not implicate concerns regarding equal 
treatment, but rather raised a question of whether employers should be required to 
provide “greater economic benefits” to accommodate the “extra” disability unique to 
women.57  Given that analytical framework, the Court concluded that, because 
Title VII promises equal, but not special treatment, the statute does not afford 
protection to a pregnant employee seeking “extra” benefits with regard to her 
employer’s disability plan.58 
                                                                
56Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138–39 (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496–97) (emphasis added). 
57See id. at 139 n.17 (referring to “‘extra’ disabilities due to pregnancy”). 
58See id. (stating that Title VII’s proscription on discrimination does not require the 
employer to pay “an incremental amount over her male counterpart due solely to the 
possibility of pregnancy related disabilities”).  The Gilbert Court acknowledged that its 
holding ran directly contrary to EEOC Guidelines promulgated in 1972, which provided that 
pregnancy disability benefits should be provided on a basis equal to that provided other 
temporary disabilities.  See id. at 140; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (2004).  To justify this 
departure, the Court first noted that EEOC Guidelines have the power to persuade, but not 
bind.  According to the Court, the “weight of such a judgment in a particular case will 
[therefore] depend upon the thoroughness of evidence in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which 
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”  Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 141 (quoting 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).  The Court then cited an early opinion 
letter issued by the General Counsel of the EEOC, which took a position directly contrary to 
that provided by the 1972 Guidelines.  Id. at 142–43.   Based on that contradictory stance, the 
Gilbert Court determined that the interpretive stance taken by the 1972 EEOC Guidelines 
deserved little persuasive weight.  Id. at 143 (“In short, while we do not wholly discount the 
weight to be given the 1972 guideline, it does not receive high marks when judged by the 
standards enunciated in Skidmore.”).   
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In a strongly-worded dissent, Justice Brennan took issue with the conclusion 
reached by the majority, which he believed “offend[ed] common sense.”59  In 
particular, Justice Brennan wrote in his dissent that it “offends common sense to 
suggest that a classification revolving around pregnancy is not, at the minimum, 
strongly ‘sex related.’”60  “Indeed, it is the capacity to become pregnant,” Justice 
Stevens concluded in his dissent, “which primarily differentiates the female from the 
male.”61 
Moreover, Justice Brennan took the majority to task for singling out pregnancy 
and childbirth as legitimate exclusions from coverage: 
Indeed, the shallowness of the Court’s “under-inclusive” analysis is 
transparent.  Had General Electric assembled a catalogue of all ailments 
that befall humanity, and then systematically proceeded to exclude from 
coverage every disability that is female-specific or predominantly afflicts 
women, the Court could still reason as here that the plan operates equally:  
Women, like men, would be entitled to draw disability payments for their 
circumcisions and prostatectomies, and neither sex could claim payment 
for pregnancies, breast cancer, and the other excluded female-dominated 
disabilities.  Along similar lines, any disability that occurs 
disproportionately in a particular group - sickle-cell anemia, for example - 
could be freely excluded from the plan without troubling the Court’s 
analytical approach.62   
In 1977, the Supreme Court applied the Gilbert framework again, in Nashville 
Gas Co. v. Satty, and held that an employer could exclude pregnancy-related leave 
from its sick leave policy without violating Title VII.63  The very next year, Congress 
responded by enacting the PDA.  
V.  1978 -- CONGRESS AMENDS TITLE VII WITH THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION 
ACT 
In 1978, Congress amended Title VII with the PDA.  With that amendment, the 
collective understanding of legally permissible treatment of pregnant employees 
changed.64  In the PDA, Congress expanded the contours of actionable sex-based 
                                                                
59Id. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
60Id.   
61Id. at 162 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
62Id. at 153 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  Justice Stevens 
commented similarly:  “the plan also insures risks such as prostatectomies, vasectomies, and 
circumcisions that are specific to the reproductive system of men and for which there exist no 
female counterparts covered by the plan.” Id. at 152. 
63Nashville Gas Co., 434 U.S. 136, 141, 143-44 (1977). 
6442 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2008). The PDA resulted directly from Congress’s “disapproval 
of both the holding and the reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert decision.” Newport News 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983).  Both House and Senate 
Reports accompanying the passage of the Act opined that the two dissenting opinions in 
Gilbert correctly interpreted the principles underlying Title VII.  See id. at 678 n.15 (citing 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978); Legislative History of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978 (Committee Print prepared for the Senate Committee on Labor 
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discrimination to include discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy, child birth, or 
related medical conditions.”65  Congress further provided that women affected by 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions “shall be treated the same for all 
employment–related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit 
programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to 
work . . . .”66  According to the PDA’s Congressional sponsor:  “[t]he entire thrust . . 
. behind this legislation [was] to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully 
and equally in the workforce, without denying them the fundamental right to full 
participation in family life.”67  
A.  What is Equal Treatment? 
A plaintiff need not be pregnant to raise a claim for pregnancy discrimination 
under the PDA.68  “[I]n using the broad phrase ‘women affected by pregnancy, 
childbirth and related medical conditions,’ the [PDA] makes clear that its protection 
extends to the whole range of matters concerning the childbearing process.”69  This 
includes “potential pregnancy” or a plaintiff who “asserts that she was discriminated 
against . . . because she is a woman who had been pregnant, had taken a maternity 
leave, and might become pregnant again.”70  Thus, all women of child bearing age 
are potentially protected by the PDA’s promise of equal treatment.   
The PDA expressly defines the proper comparator for pregnancy-related claims 
of discrimination.  Specifically, the PDA provides that “women affected by 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all 
employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their 
ability or inability to work . . . .”71  Thus, the PDA definition of sex-based 
                                                          
and Human Resources), Ser. No. 96-2, p. 148 (1979) [hereinafter Leg. Hist.], U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1978, pp. 4749, 4750; S. REP. NO. 95-331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 
(1977), Leg. Hist. at 39–40. 
65
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2008). 
66Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2008) (“The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of 
sex” include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment–related purposes, including receipt of 
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their 
ability or inability to work . . . .”). 
67123 CONG. REC. 29658 (1977). 
6842 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2008); Kocak v. Cmty. Health Partners of Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 
466, 469 (6th Cir. 2005).  
69H.R. REP. 95-948, at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4753. 
70Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 332 F.3d 1150, 1160 (8th Cir. 2003).  “Potential 
pregnancy . . . is a medical condition that is sex–related because only women can become 
pregnant.”  Id. (quoting Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 
1996)). 
7142 U.S.C. § 2000e (2008), with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(k) (emphasis added); see also Tysinger v. Police Dep’t of City of Zanesville, 463 
F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2006) (Under the PDA, “[w]omen who are affected by pregnancy, 
childbirth or related medical conditions are required to be treated the same, for all employment 
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discrimination sets forth what appears to be a simple mandate:  co-workers in similar 
employment circumstances, whether pregnant or not, must be treated the same.  How 
to define equal treatment, however, proved to be the next challenge facing the courts.  
1.  Equal Treatment Does Not Mean That An Employer Can Take No Adverse 
Action Against a Pregnant Employee   
Pregnancy, unlike, for example, skin color in a race discrimination case, directly 
affects a woman’s ability to perform her job.72  Thus, in certain circumstances, the 
PDA does not prohibit terminating the employment of a pregnant woman based on 
her inability to perform her job.  For example, the PDA’s promise of equal treatment 
does not mean that an employer must: 
1. Create a special, “light duty” assignment (or similar accommodation) for 
a woman to perform during her pregnancy, if the employer does not 
offer light duty assignments or similar accommodations to other 
temporarily disabled employees.73 
2. Hire a pregnant woman if the applicant would require a leave of absence 
immediately after starting work, if the employer would not hire anyone 
who required a similar leave.74 
3. Modify its leave policy to provide special accommodations to pregnant 
employees, “if a company’s business necessitates the adoption of 
particular leave policies.”75 
4. Continue to employ a pregnant employee when her requested leave 
coincides with the busiest time of the year for that employer.76 
Further, the physical limitations specific to pregnancy may complicate a 
woman’s ability to point to a similarly disabled comparator.  For example, in 
Tysinger v. Police Dep’t of City of Zanesville, the Sixth Circuit rejected the 
plaintiff’s attempt to point to two temporarily disabled police officers as 
comparators, because the disabled officers, although unable to fully perform their 
jobs, did not request light duty assignments: 
In fact, there is no evidence that either officer sought an accommodation 
of any kind or even advised Chief Lambes that his physician had ordered 
him off work or prescribed restrictions. Despite their temporary inability 
to perform all the duties of their positions, they continued working in their 
usual assigned capacities. It is in this crucial respect that Landerman and 
                                                          
purposes, as other persons not so affected but who are similar in their ability or inability to 
work.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).   
72See, e.g., Walker v. Fred Nesbit Distrib. Co., 331 F. Supp. 2d 780, 787–89 (S.D. Iowa 
2004). 
73Priest v. TFH-EB, Inc., 127 Ohio App. 3d 159, 165 (10th Dist. 1998) (“Federal law 
simply requires employers to treat pregnant employees the same as similarly situated 
nonpregnant employees; it does not create substantive rights to preferential treatment.”).  
74See, e.g., Marafino v. St. Louis County Circuit Ct., 707 F.2d 1005, 1006–07 (8th Cir. 
1983). 
75Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143 (1977) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)); Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(2) (1964).   
76See, e.g., Armindo v. Padlocker, Inc., 209 F.3d 1319 (Fla. 2000). 
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Madden were not similarly situated to Tysinger. Despite their temporary 
infirmities, they presented themselves to their employer as willing and 
able to continue working in their ordinary capacities. Tysinger, on the 
other hand, distinguished herself by asserting the need for and requesting 
a temporary alteration in her job duties. In this respect, she sought from 
her employer not the same or equal treatment received by Landerman and 
Madden, but more favorable treatment. Chief Lambes affirmatively stated 
that Tysinger would have received the same treatment as Landerman and 
Madden, if she had elected to continue working as a patrol officer despite 
her pregnancy: “Had she been willing to perform full duty work, she 
would not have been removed from the active duty roster.”77 
Thus, even though the temporarily disabled officers admitted that they could not 
fully perform their jobs, the fact that they did not request a temporary reassignment 
sufficiently distinguished their situation from that of the pregnant officer/plaintiff to 
defeat her pregnancy discrimination claim.  According to the Tysinger court, the 
plaintiff’s request to change her job duties while she was physically unable to 
perform those responsibilities constituted a request for more “favorable” treatment 
than her comparators, and Title VII promises women equal, but not more favorable 
treatment.    
Put simply, the PDA does not completely prohibit all adverse employment action 
taken against a pregnant employee.  Thus, much of the pregnancy discrimination 
jurisprudence turns on the ability of the plaintiff to establish that similarly disabled 
employees were treated more favorably.78   
2.   Equal Treatment Means An Employer Cannot Make Adverse Employment 
Decisions Based on Assumptions About a Pregnant Employee’s Ability to Perform 
Her Job 
Employer decision-making based on protectionist impulses may lead to employer 
liability under the PDA.  For this reason, employers must be careful to parse 
stereotypical beliefs about pregnant women’s job capabilities from the employment 
decision-making process.   For example: 
a) An employer must apply identical standards to evaluate the ability of its 
pregnant and temporarily disabled employees to work.79   
b) It is a violation of the PDA to take an adverse employment action based on 
an assumption that a pregnant woman will leave her job after giving birth.80  
                                                                
77463 F.3d 569, 574 (6th Cir. 2006) 
78See William G. Phelps, J.D., What Constitutes Termination of Employee Due to 
Pregnancy in Violation of Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendment to Title VII of Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k), 130 A.L.R. FED. 473 (1996); Stout v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 861 (5th Cir. 2002) (if all employees taking a leave under 
similarly disabling circumstances face the same adverse employment action, a court will likely 
find that proscribed pregnancy-based discrimination did not cause the adverse action, and the 
plaintiff/employee’s claim for pregnancy discrimination must fail. To hold otherwise would be 
to transform the PDA into a guarantee of medical leave for pregnant employees, something 
[courts] have specifically held that the PDA does not do.”) (emphasis added). 
79See Automobile Workers, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1990). 
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c) It is a violation of the PDA to take an adverse employment action based on 
an assumption that a pregnant woman is incapable of performing her job 
responsibilities.81 
Consider, for example, a position waiting tables in a restaurant:  “As long as [the 
pregnant woman] can do the work of a waitress, [the employer] cannot deny her the 
job because he fears that at some point [she] won’t be physically able to carry heavy 
trays or because [the employer is] afraid that she’ll miscarry if she does carry the 
trays or because he’s afraid of what his customers might think if he allows her to 
carry the trays throughout her pregnancy.  If it turns out that [she] is unable to lift the 
serving trays, then [the employer] must treat her [like] any other employee similarly 
unable to perform this function of the job. Let’s say that another waiter . . . breaks his 
arm.  If [the employer] arranges for a bus boy to carry [that waiter’s] trays, that’s 
what [the employer] should do for [the pregnant waitress].”82 
d) It is a violation of the PDA to adopt employment policies or decisions that 
seek to “protect” the health of pregnant women and/or their unborn child.83      
In Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., for example, the court held that a hospital’s 
concern for the health of a woman’s fetus and fear of liability for damages to the 
future child did not constitute a business necessity justifying termination of pregnant 
x-ray technician, when the hospital failed to utilize available, alternative, less 
discriminatory means of achieving its business purpose (such as granting a leave of 
absence).84  
e) It is a violation of the PDA and Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112 to adopt 
employment policies to address subjective concerns about pregnant women.   
For example, an employer who adopted an employment policy requiring that 
pregnant women wear makeup, based on a premise that pregnant employees are less 
attractive, was found to have violated the PDA in Tamimi v. Howard Johnson Co. 85  
                                                          
80Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 769 (Ill. 1999).  But see Troupe v. May Dep’t. 
Stores Co., in which the Seventh Circuit found that an employer who terminated a pregnant 
employee based on a fear that she would not return to work after her pregnancy leave, coupled 
with its desire to avoid paying the costs of her maternity leave, asserted a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for her termination. 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).  Note also that if 
the employer designates the employee’s leave as FMLA leave, the employee will be entitled to 
reinstatement at the end of that leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). Specifically, an employee out 
on FMLA leave is entitled to reinstatement to his or her previously held job or “an equivalent 
position” with equivalent employment benefits, pay and other terms and conditions of 
employment. Id.  
81Touvell v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Retardation and Dev. Disabilities, 422 F.3d 392, 
403 (Ohio 2005). 
82THE UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, SEX DISCRIMINATION ISSUES, PRACTICAL GUIDANCE ON PREGNANCY 
DISCRIMINATION, at G-1 (1998) [hereinafter EEOC PRACTICAL GUIDANCE].  
83See Atteberry v. Dep’t. of State Police, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1214 (C.D. Ill. 2002) 
(holding that pregnancy was “a medical condition without medical restrictions” and that no 
evidence was introduced indicating that Plaintiff objecting to light-duty assignment was 
physically prevented from performing her duties as a police officer). 
84692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982). 
85807 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1987).   
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The company’s proffered reason for the policy –– that it wanted to maintain its 
“public image” and that a pregnant woman that did not wear makeup tarnished that 
image –– did not constitute a business justification sufficient to defeat the plaintiff’s 
sex and pregnancy discrimination claims.86    
B.  Equal Treatment with Regard to Medical Benefits and Leave 
1.  The Meaning of Equal Treatment with Regard to Medical and Fringe Benefits 
Title VII’s promise of equal treatment with regard to the “terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment” also includes fringe benefits, such as health insurance 
coverage for employees and their spouses.87  An employer who provides benefits to 
workers on leave must extend the same benefits to women on leave for pregnancy-
related conditions.88  Seniority, vacation calculation, and pay rate determinations also 
must be provided on an equal basis.89  The provision of benefits triggers the 
responsibility to provide benefits equally. 
While the PDA does not require employers to extend any medical benefits to 
employees, it nonetheless requires employers to include coverage for pregnancy, 
childbirth and other related costs, if the employer decides to offer any medical 
benefits at all.90  “If an employer’s health plan covers pre-existing medical 
conditions, then it must cover an insured employee’s pre-existing pregnancy.  
Deductibles for pregnancy-related medical costs must [b]e the same as deductibles 
for other conditions.  Limitations on expenses cannot be applied exclusively for 
pregnancy-related conditions.”91  An employer must extend medical benefits to 
pregnant employees in the same manner it extends those benefits to other employees 
with similarly-diminished capacities.92   
Further, Title VII and the PDA protect both men and women with regard to 
pregnancy-related fringe benefits.  Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer to discriminate between men and women with regard to the 
granting of fringe benefits.  To the extent any benefits are granted in association with 
                                                                
86
 Id. at 1554. 
87See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 673 (1983) 
(holding that fringe benefits must be provided on a non-discriminatory basis).  The Newport 
News court found that a health insurance plan granting less coverage to the pregnancy-related 
disabilities of employees’ spouses violated Title VII because the plan gave “married male 
employees a benefit package for their dependents that [was] less inclusive than the 
dependency coverage provided to married female employees.”  Id. at 684. 
88See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (finding that a policy that, on its 
face, appeared to be neutral, but in effect denied accumulated seniority to female employees 
returning from pregnancy leave, violated Title VII). 
89See id. 
90See EEOC PRACTICAL GUIDANCE, supra note 81, at G–2.  
91Id. at G-3. 
92See, e.g., Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Comp. Plans 
v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (holding that an employer violated Title VII when the plans 
offered by that employer to its employees each paid women lower monthly retirement benefits 
than men who made the same contributions). 
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pregnancy-related leave, the employer must extend equal benefits to its male and 
female employees.93  For example, in Newport News Shipbuilding, the Supreme 
Court held that an employer’s health insurance plan violated Title VII because it 
provided female employees more pregnancy-related benefits than it did to the 
spouses of male employees.94  Thus, with regard to fringe benefits, equal treatment 
means equal coverage. 
2.  The Meaning of Equal Treatment with Regard to Pregnancy or Maternity Leave 
The EEOC defines “maternity leave” as “the period of a female employee’s 
physical inability to work as a result of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical 
conditions,” which includes an additional period of absence taken after childbirth to 
care for the baby.95  The PDA does not require that an employer have a maternity 
leave policy but, to the extent that an employer permits its employees to take 
pregnancy-related disability leave (e.g., maternity leave) the PDA imposes certain 
requirements.96  Specifically, with regard to pregnancy-related leave, the PDA 
requires:   
“If an employer allows leave for temporary disabilities not related to pregnancy, 
it may not deny leave for pregnancy-related disabilities or apply different terms or 
conditions to such leave.”97   
• “An employer may not specify the time that maternity leave 
commences.”98   
• “An employer must use the same procedures to determine a pregnant 
employee’s ability to work as it uses to determine a temporarily disabled 
employee’s ability to work.”99   
• The leave granted to pregnant women must be similar to that granted to 
employees with temporary disabilities.100 
• An employer cannot order a pregnant woman to go on leave.101  
                                                                
93See id.  EEOC sex discrimination guidelines provide similarly, stating that “it shall be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate between men and women with 
regard to fringe benefits.”  Id. 
94Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).   
95EEOC PRACTICAL GUIDANCE, supra note 81, at G–2.  States can provide greater 
pregnancy benefits than that provided by the PDA.  See Cal. Fed. Savings & Loan v. Guerra, 
479 U.S. 272 (1987) (holding that Title VII does not preempt a state law that required 
employers to provide four months unpaid leave to pregnant female employees). 
96See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75 (1984) (“A benefit that is part and 
parcel of the employment relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even 
if the employer would be free . . . not to provide the benefit at all”). 
97EEOC PRACTICAL GUIDANCE, supra note 81, at G-2. 
98Id. at G-3.  
99Id. 
100See Maddox v. Grandview Care Ctr., 780 F.2d 987, 991 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that 
the employer discriminated when it offered three months leave for pregnancy–related medical 
conditions but offered longer periods of time for leave associated with non-pregnancy-related 
health conditions or disabilities). 
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VI.  BEYOND THE PDA:  THE FMLA, OHIO LAW, AND PREGNANCY-RELATED 
WORKPLACE LEAVE 
A.  The Family Medical Leave Act and Pregnancy-Related Workplace Leave 
The PDA does not require that an employer provide its employees with 
pregnancy-related medical leave.102  However, pursuant to the Family Medical Leave 
Act (“FMLA”), pregnant employees may be entitled to pregnancy-related leave.103  
The FMLA entitles an eligible employee104 of a covered employer105 to 12 weeks of 
unpaid leave each year for personal and family related health conditions, including 
those specifically related to, inter alia, pregnancy, the birth or adoption of a child, the 
care of a family member with a serious health condition, or recovery from an 
employee’s own serious health condition.106   
                                                          
101See also EEOC Notice, Policy Guidance on Parental Leave, N-915-058 (August  27, 
1990), in THE UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, SEX DISCRIMINATION ISSUES, at 1 (1998).  Employers may also develop 
“parental leave” policies.  For male employees, parental leave is “leave to care for a child of 
any age or to develop a healthy parent-child relationship, or to help a family adjust to the 
presence of a newborn or adopted child.”  Id.  Parental leave is therefore “applicable to leave 
to care for any family member at any age or, indeed, leave for any purpose.”  Id.  With regard 
to parental leave for childcare, Title VII requires that the employer grant men and women 
equal lengths of leave.   
102Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 861 (5th Cir. 2002). 
103FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2005).  The FMLA requires that covered employers provide 
their employees who otherwise qualify for coverage at least twelve weeks per year of unpaid 
leave for personal and family related health conditions, including those specifically related to, 
inter alia, pregnancy, childbirth, and adoption.  Id. 
104
“An ‘eligible employee’ is an employee of a covered employer who: (1) Has been 
employed by the employer for at least 12 months, and (2) Has been employed for at least 
1,250 hours of service during the 12-month period immediately preceding the commencement 
of the leave, and (3) Is employed at a worksite where 50 or more employees are employed by 
the employer within 75 miles of that worksite.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(a) (2009).  “The 12 
months an employee must have been employed by the employer need not be consecutive 
months, provided . . . If an employee is maintained on the payroll for any part of a week, 
including any periods of paid or unpaid leave (sick, vacation) during which other benefits or 
compensation are provided by the employer (e.g., workers’ compensation, group health plan 
benefits, etc.), the week counts as a week of employment.”  29 C.F.R. § 825.110(b)(3) (2009). 
105
“An employer covered by FMLA is any person engaged in commerce or in any industry 
or activity affecting commerce, who employs 50 or more employees for each working day 
during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year.”  29 
C.F.R. § 825.104(a) (2009).  “Employers covered by FMLA also include any person acting, 
directly or indirectly, in the interest of a covered employer to any of the employees of the 
employer, any successor in interest of a covered employer, and any public agency.  Public 
agencies are covered employers without regard to the number of employees employed.  Public 
as well as private elementary and secondary schools are also covered employers without 
regard to the number of employees employed.”  Id.   
10629 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1), (c) (2005); 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(a)(2) (2009). Note that 
although FMLA only entitles the employee to take unpaid leave, the employee is entitled 
continuing health care coverage during that leave.  Note also that an employee out on FMLA 
leave is entitled to reinstatement to his or her previously held job or “an equivalent position” 
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Complications during pregnancy may constitute a “serious health condition” 
entitling an employee to take FMLA leave.107  For example, in Hiemer v. Anthem Ins. 
Co., the plaintiff’s pregnancy exacerbated a severe lung condition, for which she 
took intermittent FMLA leave until the birth of her baby.108   
Note that both men and women are entitled to take FMLA leave for child birth- 
and adoption- related events.109  Thus, for eligible male and female employees of 
covered employers, the FMLA supplements the rights provided by Title VII. 
B.  Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112, Pregnancy Discrimination and Pregnancy-
Related Workplace Leave  
Ohio law regarding pregnancy discrimination is set forth in Ohio Revised Code 
(“O.R.C.”) Chapter 4112.  Ohio adopted § 4112.02 prior to the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.  In 1980, after the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in Gilbert and 
Congressional passage of the PDA in 1978, the Ohio legislature adopted § 
4112.01(B), which provides that for employers with four or more employees, the 
terms “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” include discrimination “because of 
or on the basis of pregnancy, any illness arising out of and occurring during the 
course of a pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”  This amendment 
to the definitions section of Chapter 4112 redefined the terms “because of sex” and 
“on the basis of sex” to incorporate the language of the PDA.   
The meaning of R.C. § 4112.01(B) can also be found, in part, in an 
administrative rule enacted by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (“OCRC”) “to 
clarify the rights and obligations of employers and pregnant employees . . . .”110  
Specifically, R.C. § 4112(A)(4) empowers the OCRC “to adopt, promulgate [and] 
amend … rules to effectuate the provisions of [Chapter 4112] and the policies and 
practices of the commission in connection with this chapter.”111  Pursuant to that 
enabling provision, the OCRC enacted Ohio Administrative Code § 4112-5-05.  
While the Ohio Supreme Court has held that “federal case law interpreting Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . is generally applicable to cases involving alleged 
violations of R.C. Chapter 4112,”112 as can be seen below, the OCRC has extended 
protections to pregnant employees beyond those provided by federal law interpreting 
the PDA.   
                                                          
with equivalent employment benefits, pay and other terms and conditions of employment.  29 
U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1) (2008).   
107Order granting in part, denying in part Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Hiemer v. 
Anthem Ins. Co., (S.D. Ohio 2007) (No. C-1-05-124), 2007 WL 915191.   
108Id. at *1.  
109See, e.g., Alston v. Sofa Express, No. 2:06-CV-0491, 2007 WL 3071662 (S.D. Ohio 
Oct. 19, 2007) (plaintiff took FMLA leave for the birth of his daughter).   
110Kevin P. McNeil, Reasonable and Sufficient Pregnancy Leave: Refining the Ohio Civil 
Rights Commission’s Rule on Pregnancy Discrimination, in HOT ISSUES IN EMPLOYMENT LAW: 
FMLA/LEAVE AND WAGE/HOUR, 2.1, 2.1 (Ohio State Bar Assoc. ed., 2000) [hereinafter 
Reasonable and Sufficient Pregnancy Leave].  
111Id. at 2.2. 
112Hollingsworth v. Time Warner Cable, 157 Ohio App. 3d 539, 2004-Ohio-3130, 812 
N.E.2d 976.   
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1.  Ohio Administrative Code Section 4112-5-05 Interprets Chapter 4112 to Require 
that an Employer Provide its Pregnant Employees Reasonable and Sufficient Leave 
Pursuant to Ohio Administrative Code § 4112-5-05, the OCRC has “made clear 
that the prohibition against pregnancy discrimination set forth in Ohio Revised Code 
Chapter 4112[:]” 
• “includes the failure or refusal of an employer to provide a pregnant 
employee with leave for pregnancy, childbirth or a related medical 
condition;”  
• “requires that women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or a related 
medical condition be permitted to take leave for a reasonable period of 
time;” 
• “prohibits employers from terminating an employee affected by 
pregnancy, childbirth or a related medical condition under the auspices 
of a policy that provides insufficient or no pregnancy/maternity 
leave.”113 
 
Further, Ohio Administrative Code § 4112-5-05(G) provides that: 
 
• “Where termination of employment of an employee who is temporarily 
disabled due to pregnancy or a related medical condition is caused by an 
employment policy under which insufficient or no maternity leave is 
available, such termination shall constitute unlawful sex 
discrimination.”114 
• “[I]f the employer has no leave policy, childbearing must be considered 
by the employer to be a justification for leave of absence for a female 
employee for a reasonable period of time.”115 
 
Hence Chapter 4112, as interpreted by Ohio Administrative Code § 4112-5-05, 
goes further than Title VII, which courts hold does not necessarily require the 
provision of maternity leave.  Federal case law interpreting the PDA, therefore, is not 
instructive as to Chapter 4112’s pregnancy-related prohibitions in this regard.   
The OCRC has acknowledged that the rule set forth in Ohio Administrative Code 
§ 4112-5-05 “has generated a noticeable degree of uncertainty” and that it is “often 
difficult to apply because it does not tell employers or employees when leave for 
pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions is ‘reasonable’ or, on the other 
                                                                
113Reasonable and Sufficient Pregnancy Leave, supra note 108, at 2.3 (citing OHIO ADMIN. 
CODE § 4112:5-05(G) (2008). 
114Id. (citing OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112:5-05(G)(2) (2008)); see also Marvel Consultants, 
Inc. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm’n (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 838, 841, 639 N.E.2d 1265, 1267 
(“Denial of maternity leave mandated by [OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5112:5-05(G) (2008)] is, in 
effect, terminating the employee because of her pregnancy.”).   
115Reasonable and Sufficient Pregnancy Leave, supra note 108, at 2.3 (citing OHIO ADMIN. 
CODE § 4112:5-05(G)(6) (2008)); see also McConaughy v. Boswell Oil Co. (1998), 126 Ohio 
App.3d 820, 829, 711 N.E.2d 719, 725 (noting “if any employer has a leave policy, a female 
employee must be provided a leave of absence ‘for a reasonable period of time’”).   
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hand, ‘insufficient.’”116   Accordingly, in 2004, “to provide guidance on the issue of 
what constitutes reasonable and sufficient leave under the agency’s rule on 
pregnancy discrimination,” the OCRC adopted Technical Policy T-29, 
Pregnancy/Maternity Leave.117  According to that Policy: 
 
• “Women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical 
condition are entitled to at least the same amount and type of leave and 
benefits as other employees who are provided leave and benefits and 
who are similar in their ability or inability to work.”118 
• “A leave policy providing at least twelve weeks of pregnancy/maternity 
leave, applied regardless of length of service, is presumed to be 
reasonable and sufficient; however the reasonableness and sufficiency of 
a leave policy may be rebutted based upon the past practices of the 
employer, the type of work involved and other relevant factors.”119 
• “No employer is required to provide unlimited pregnancy/maternity 
leave, unless it provides unlimited leave to other employees similar in 
their ability or inability to work.”120 
 
In effect, Technical Policy T-29 “creates a presumption — albeit a rebuttable 
presumption — that the period of leave provided is reasonable and sufficient” when 
an employer provides its employees 12 weeks of unpaid maternity leave.121  The 
corollary is also true:  an employer that does not provide its pregnant employees at 
least 12 weeks of leave cannot take advantage of the presumption that the leave it 
provided was reasonable and sufficient.122  In such circumstances, the OCRC “will 
make a case-by-case determination of reasonableness and sufficiency, and will 
examine and consider any relevant, legitimate factors that may make a leave period 
shorter than the 12 weeks nonetheless reasonable and sufficient (e.g., the size of an 
employer, the nature of the position, or the complexity of operations).”123   
The OCRC advises employers to “take advantage of the safe harbor afforded 
under Technical Policy T-29” by making available 12 weeks of leave to its 
employees, “regardless of how long that employee has been employed” and 
“exclusively for pregnancy, childbirth or a related medical condition.”124  Although 
this does not ensure that the OCRC will conclude that the employer complied with 
Ohio law, the OCRC will at least “begin its investigation with the presumption that 
                                                                
116
 Reasonable and Sufficient Pregnancy Leave, supra note 108, at 2.4 (citing OHIO 
ADMIN. CODE § 4112:5-05(G) (2008). 
117Id. at 2.5. 
118Id. 
119Id. at 2.6. 
120Id.  
121Id.  
122Id. 
123Id.  
124Id. at 2.7. 
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the period of leave provided by the employer is reasonable, sufficient and in 
compliance with Ohio law.”125 
2.  The Ohio Civil Rights Commission’s Proposed Revisions to Ohio Administrative 
Code Section 4112-5-05 
The OCRC is currently undertaking a revision to the pregnancy discrimination 
rule “to redefine the current loose Ohio policy to provide ‘reasonable leave’ for 
women.”126 In its initial submission to the Ohio Joint Committee on Agency Rule 
Review (“JCARR”), the OCRC contended that its rule requiring employers to 
provide 12 weeks of maternity leave –– no matter what –– would have zero 
economic impact on business.127   “Business owners vehemently disagree[d].”128  
Accordingly, the JCARR rejected the OCRC’s initial proposal, requiring the OCRC 
to conduct an economic impact report before resubmitting its proposed rule to the 
JCARR.129   
According to the OCRC, by revising the pregnancy discrimination rule, its goal is 
“to identify and eliminate the invisible barriers to equality and fairness that women 
face in the workplace due to pregnancy”––i.e., “those policies and practices that on 
the surface appear neutral and equally applied, but in reality create an unfair, gender-
specific disadvantage to women.”130 The OCRC further contends that “this proposed 
revision would address those employment situations in which the leave that an 
employee is otherwise eligible to take is not adequate for a normal pregnancy, or the 
conditions imposed on eligibility for leave, i.e., a length of service requirement, have 
disparate impact upon pregnant employees.”131   
                                                                
125Id. (emphasis added).  “This means that an employer cannot refuse to provide the same 
benefits and privileges to a woman affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical 
conditions simply because she has not been on the job long enough, or because her pregnancy 
is not due to a work-related injury.”  Id. 
126Kristen Hampshire, Understanding Leave Policies Can Protect Your Business from 
Costly Lawsuits, INSIDE BUSINESS, June 1, 2008, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/ 
labor-employment/labor-sector-performance-labor-force/11483352-1.html. 
127Hampshire, supra note 124.  The Ohio General Assembly, Joint Committee on Agency 
Rule Review Home Page, https://www.jcarr.state.oh.us/.  “The Joint Committee on Agency 
Rule Review (“JCARR”) was created in 1977 by HB 257 of the 112th General Assembly (RC 
101.35).”  “The primary function of JCARR is to review proposed new, amended, and 
rescinded rules to ensure the following:  (1) the rules do not exceed the scope of the rule-
making agency's statutory authority; (2) the rules do not conflict with a rule of that agency or 
another rule-making agency; (3) the rules do not conflict with the intent of the legislature in 
enacting the statute under which the rule is proposed; and, (4) the rule-making agency has 
prepared a complete and accurate rule summary and fiscal analysis of the proposed rule, 
amendment, or rescission (RC 127.18) and if the agency has incorporated a text or other 
material by reference, the agency has not met the standards stated in ORC sections 121.72, 
121.75, or 121.76.”   JCARR, supra (emphasis added).  
128Hampshire, supra note 124. 
129Id.  
130Reasonable and Sufficient Pregnancy Leave, supra note 108, at 2.7. 
131Id.  
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As it currently stands, the revisions to the pregnancy discrimination rule 
proposed by the OCRC includes the following provisions: 
 
• “[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical 
conditions [would be] entitled to the same benefits and privileges of 
employment as any other employee similar in his or her inability to 
work, irrespective of whether the pregnant employee is otherwise 
similarly situated in other respects;”132   
• Employers would be required to provide pregnant employees with “a 
minimum leave of up to [twelve] weeks, except when a lesser amount of 
leave is justified by a business necessity;” and133 
• “[U]pon signifying her intent to return to employment,” the employer 
would be required to permit the employee “to return to work without a 
change in position, or a loss of service time or other benefits.”134 
 
3.  Has the OCRC Gone Too Far?   
The OCRC has yet to promulgate the proposed revisions to Ohio Administrative 
Code § 4112-5-05.  According to the Commission, it still must conduct research and 
analysis into issues regarding “the amount of leave needed by pregnant employees,135 
tenure/length of service requirements for qualifying leave,136 and the interplay 
between the rule and light duty programs for injured workers.”137 
                                                                
132Id. at 2.8 (emphasis added). 
133Id. (emphasis added).   
134Id. (emphasis added).  The revisions, as currently proposed by the OCRC, would 
expand protections currently afforded by Chapter 4112 to pregnant employees.  See discussion 
infra Section 3.  These revisions, however, are not without limitation.  In particular, the OCRC 
further proposes that, pursuant to the revised rule,  (1) the employer would have discretion 
whether to pay the employee during her twelve week period of leave; (2) the leave would have 
to be medically recommended; and (3) the right to reinstatement would be “limited to that 
period of leave otherwise available to a pregnant employee under the rule.”  Reasonable and 
Sufficient Pregnancy Leave, supra note 108 at 2.8.   
135Id.  “Under the current rule, the amount of leave that an employer must provide to a 
pregnant employee is ambiguous and uncertain, i.e., the amount of leave must be reasonable 
and sufficient.”  Id. at 2.9. 
136Id. at 2.8. According to the OCRC, “[t]he availability of leave is considered to be a 
critical component of ensuring equal employment opportunity for pregnant employees, even 
when similar leave is not otherwise available to other employees.  Again, this is due to the 
simple fact that pregnant employees always require a minimum leave of absence from work.”  
Id. at 2.9. 
137Id. at 2.8.  The OCRC contends that “[o]ne of the most contentious pregnancy issues is 
whether pregnant employees must be eligible for light duty programs limited to employees 
who have suffered an on-the-job injury.”  Id. at 2.9.  Many employers take the position that 
“their programs [are] limited to employees with on-the-job injuries,” and that this requirement 
is “primarily an effort to avoid an often substantial increase in workers compensation 
premiums.”  Id.  “This is an issue that the Ohio Civil Rights Commission would like to 
address in its next revision.” NEED SOURCE.  
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There are, however, problems with the revisions to the rule proposed by the 
OCRC.  For example, there is no question that imposing a mandatory period of 12 
week leave and a mandatory reinstatement requirement imposes greater requirements 
upon employers than that which was previously called for by Chapter 4112.  What 
was once a presumption of reasonableness and sufficiency would be transformed into 
a hard and fast rule.   
As noted above, the OCRC has already promulgated administrative regulations 
which provide that Chapter 4112 requires that employers provide their pregnant 
employees reasonable and sufficient leave.  Such proposed leave requirements 
appear more like FMLA-conferred rights than those afforded pregnant employees by 
Title VII and the PDA.  Moreover, with its proposed amendment to Ohio 
Administrative Code § 4112-5-05, the OCRC, in effect, proposes to read additional, 
mandatory FMLA-like leave benefits into Chapter 4112.  This raises the question of 
whether the OCRC has the power to enact such a rule. 
Chapter 4112 promises pregnant employees equal treatment.  What the OCRC 
proposes to provide pregnant employees, however, is better treatment than other 
similarly disabled employees.  More specifically, with its proposed rule, the OCRC 
would require that Ohio employers provide their pregnant employees with 12 weeks 
of leave.138  Under Ohio law, however, employers are not required to provide other 
employees with 12 weeks of leave, even if those employees are similar to pregnant 
women in their ability or inability to work.  Thus, the administrative rule currently 
proposed by the OCRC confers the benefit of 12 weeks mandatory leave only upon 
pregnant employees, providing those employees better treatment than other similarly 
disabled employees.  By promising pregnant employees better treatment, the OCRC 
and its proposed administrative rule goes beyond the equal treatment promised 
pregnant women by O.R.C. § 4112.01(B).139 
While the goal underlying the OCRC’s reform effort is certainly laudatory, the 
question still remains whether the OCRC in fact has the power to go this far.  Is the 
OCRC acting within the power conferred upon it to “adopt, promulgate [and] amend 
. . . rules to effectuate the provisions of [Chapter 4112],” or is the OCRC taking it 
upon itself to expand the meaning of what constitutes illegal discrimination on the 
basis of sex, as it is defined by O.R.C. § 4112.01(B)?140  Without further action by 
the Ohio legislature (i.e., by enacting a state law that mirrors the FMLA), it would 
seem that the OCRC’s proposed revision to Ohio Administrative Code § 4112-5-05 
may overstep the agency’s rulemaking authority.   
                                                                
138Note that under the OCRC’s proposed rule, FMLA leave is not a set-off.  Thus, if an 
employee has taken (for example) 10 weeks of FMLA leave –– for a reason unrelated to 
pregnancy ––  the employee is still entitled to 12 weeks of pregnancy-related leave. See 
Reasonable and Sufficient Pregnancy Leave, supra note 108. 
139See supra, Section V.A (“What is Equal Treatment?”).  
140Further, the revisions proposed by the OCRC to the agency’s pregnancy discrimination 
rule may raise more questions than it resolves.  For example, with regard to the mandatory 
provision of twelve weeks of leave, it remains unclear what would constitute a legitimate 
“business necessity” meriting exception to the rule. The OCRC acknowledges that “there are 
some situations where this approach may not be feasible,” such as for temporary or other 
nonpermanent workers.” Reasonable and Sufficient Pregnancy Leave, supra note 108, at 2.9.  
Does the switch to a mandatory rule, with an exception for business necessity, really add 
anything to employers’ understanding of the requirements of Chapter 4112? 
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The OCRC may not have the authority to promulgate mandatory leave 
regulations, but the Ohio legislature does.  Thus, perhaps the best means by which to 
impose a 12-week maternity leave requirement is to call for an amendment to 
Chapter 4112 that mirrors the language of Ohio Administrative Code § 4112-5-05 or 
the FMLA.   
VII.  CURRENTLY UNPROTECTED BY LAW:  BREAST-FEEDING, BREAST-PUMPING AND 
RELATED MEDICAL NEEDS 
With regard to conditions that could be deemed as pregnancy-related, the PDA is 
by no means comprehensive.  There is a notable absence of current federal 
legislation responsive to post-pregnancy issues facing working mothers today.  In 
particular, there is an absence of legislation dealing with mothers’ need to breastfeed 
their newborn children and their corollary need to pump breast milk during the 
workday.  The PDA’s prohibition against pregnancy-related discrimination, Title 
VII’s prohibition against gender discrimination, the ADA, and the FMLA do not 
provide women any rights regarding breastfeeding, which would seem to be a 
pregnancy-related condition uniquely experienced by women.141   
Breast-feeding and pumping activities involve the physical condition of women 
who have recently given birth.  In this regard, lactating could be deemed a 
pregnancy-related condition.  According to the courts, however, breastfeeding and 
weaning do not constitute the types of conditions “related to pregnancy” that 
Congress intended to protect with the PDA.142  Technically, according to those 
courts, a woman is no longer pregnant when breastfeeding.  Moreover, the need to 
pump breast milk or feed a baby no longer relates to the mother’s pregnant condition, 
but instead bears a direct relationship to her need to care for her child––i.e., lactating 
is a condition related to childcare, not pregnancy.143  Accordingly, courts have held 
that the PDA does not confer any rights on women with regard to breastfeeding or 
the need to pump breast milk.144   
As a practical matter, because the PDA does not cover conditions related to 
lactating, an employer can terminate an employee who needs to leave work 
frequently to breastfeed her child or to pump breast milk.145  So when faced with a 
                                                                
141The FMLA does provide women the right to take unpaid leave from work for care of a 
newborn, but this right does not address the issue of activities conducted while at work. 
142McNill v. New York City Dep’t of Corr., 950 F. Supp. 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“We 
believe these factors indicate Congress’ intent that ‘related medical conditions’ be limited to 
incapacitating conditions for which medical care or treatment is usual and normal. Neither 
breast-feeding and weaning, nor difficulties arising therefrom, constitute such conditions.”) 
(quoting Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 869–70 (W.D. Ky. 1990), aff’d 
without opinion, 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991)). 
143See id. 
144For example, in McNill v. New York City Dep’t of Corr., the court held that plaintiff’s 
absence from work to breastfeed her child was not an absence related to “pregnancy, 
childbirth or [a] related medical condition” within the meaning of the PDA, and therefore not 
an activity protected by the Act. Id. at 564. 
145Likewise, “absent unusual conditions,” the ADA does not cover breastfeeding.  See 
Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc. and M.S.N.B.C., Inc., 49 F.Supp. 2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(finding that “[e]very court to consider the question to date has ruled that pregnancy and 
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request by a new mother to accommodate her breast pumping needs, an employer is 
not required to accommodate her request.  For example, current federal law does not 
require that an employer accommodate a female employee’s request to provide a 
private area for her to pump her breast milk.146  Courts, repeatedly holding that such 
requests are beyond the scope of Title VII and PDA protection, have effectively 
banished breast pumping women to locked back rooms and bathroom stalls.   
A.  An Amendment to Title VII May Be Necessary to Protect Lactating-Related Needs 
of New Mothers 
Although it is not presently covered, the question remains whether breastfeeding 
should be an activity protected by the PDA.  Arguably, a legislative amendment 
would not be needed if courts recast lactating as a physical condition that is naturally 
a part of a woman’s pregnant condition, thereby constituting a “pregnancy-related 
condition” within the scope of the Act.  This result would require abandoning the 
current analytical linchpin, which views lactating (and the choice to breastfeed) as a 
                                                          
related medical conditions do not, absent unusual conditions, constitute a [disability] under the 
ADA” and the need to pump breast milk does not qualify as an “unusual condition” triggering 
coverage by the ADA because “it is simply preposterous to contend a woman’s body is 
functioning abnormally because she is lactating”) (quoting Bond v. Sterling, 997 F. Supp. 306 
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) (emphasis added).   
146See, e.g., Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc. and M.S.N.B.C., Inc., 49 F.Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999) (holding that Title VII and the PDA do not impose requirements on employers to 
provide space in which women may pump their breast milk).  In Martinez, an associate 
producer sought to use an electronic breast pump at work “to pump breast milk to feed her 
child when she was not available to nurse him.  With [her supervisor’s] consent, Martinez left 
her work to pump breast milk three times a day for periods of about twenty minutes,” using an 
empty edit room at MSNBC’s studio.  Id. at 307.  Martinez locked the door but, on several 
occasions, however, someone tried to enter the room with a key while she was inside.  
Martinez requested that NBC provide her with a private room to pump her breast milk.  
MSNBC offered alternative solutions, but ultimately denied her request for a private room 
specially allocated for breast pumping purposes.  Id.   
Among other things, Martinez’s charge with the EEOC alleged that her former employer 
“‘failed to provide [her] with a safe, secure, sanitary and private area to breast pump’ and that 
her complaint to human resources was followed by a course of retaliatory conduct including 
verbal harassment, schedule changes, and the demotion to associate producer.”  Id. at 308.  
The Martinez court rejected her contention that Title VII requires employers to provide 
mothers a special area for breast pumping by citing the principal tenet that Title VII promises 
equal, but not special treatment.  Id. (citing General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 135 
(1976)).   
The Martinez court also rejected Martinez’s contention that discriminating against 
breastfeeding mothers could form the basis of a “sex-plus” discrimination claim––i.e., 
discrimination that occurs “when a person is subjected to disparate treatment based not only 
on her sex, but on her sex considered in conjunction with a second characteristic” –– because 
Martinez would be unable to point to an appropriate male comparator.   Id. at 310 (internal 
quotations omitted).  According to that court, “men are physiologically incapable of pumping 
breast milk, so plaintiff cannot show that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated 
men.”  Id.  For this reason, the “sex-plus” theory cannot logically extend to protect “a 
characteristic — breast feeding — that is unique to women.”  Id.    
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means of childcare, not pregnancy.147  Accordingly, a shift in perception, as opposed 
to legislation, could bring lactating-related activities within the parameters of Title 
VII and the PDA.  
It is more likely, however, that a legislative amendment to the PDA will be 
needed before employers and courts will recognize the lactating-related issues 
unique to female employees who have recently become mothers.  Indeed, one court 
expressly acknowledged as much, stating that, “[i]f Congress had wanted these sorts 
of child-care concerns to be covered by Title VII or the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act, it could have included them in the plain language of the statutes.  It did not.  It is 
not the province of this court to add to the legislation by judicial fiat.”148  Thus, 
absent a legislative amendment to the PDA, there is unlikely to be much meaningful 
change regarding the extension of PDA coverage to breastfeeding mothers.149  
B.  Proposed Analytical Framework 
To protect the lactation-related needs of employees, Congress could amend the 
PDA to require that employers reasonably accommodate working mothers who are 
lactating and need to pump breast milk during the workday.  Such a duty could 
thereby incorporate analytical principles already found in the reasonable 
accommodation provisions of Title VII150 and the ADA.151   
Interpretative case law addressing the accommodation requirements of Title VII 
and/or the ADA may inform, in a general sense, the analysis of any proposed 
lactation-related  statutory accommodation requirements.  With regard to lactation-
related accommodations, this could mean:    
 
• An employee must first request an accommodation for her lactation-
related needs;  
                                                                
147See McNill v. New York City Dep’t. of Corr., 950 F. Supp. 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
148Id. at 571 (quoting Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 869–70 (W.D. Ky. 
1990), aff’d without opinion, 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991)). 
149Some states, however, have sought to fill the gaps left by federal statute through 
legislative enactments of their own.  Ohio, for example, recently enacted a statute granting 
women the right to breastfeed their children in public buildings.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3781.55 (West 2005) (“Breast-feeding in place of public accommodation”) (effective 
September 16, 2005).   
150Title VII imposes a duty upon employers to accommodate an “employee’s or 
prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the 
conduct of the employer’s business.”  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1991).  
151In certain circumstances, employers are required by the ADA to provide a “reasonable” 
accommodation to an employee with a disability.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12112.  Like Title 
VII, the ADA does not require that an employer implement any means of accommodation that 
constitute an undue hardship on the employer –– but under the ADA, an accommodation that 
causes an undue hardship on the employer is, by definition, not reasonable.  See Vande Zande 
v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that cost may factor into 
the undue hardship analysis).  The analytical distinction is a subtle one –– under Title VII, the 
undue hardship analysis only comes into play if the employee suggests the method of 
accommodation, whereas a court will always consider the undue hardship of an 
accommodation on the employer under the ADA.   
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• If an employer offers no accommodation or does not provide an 
accommodation that is reasonable, the employee may make suggestions 
in that regard; and 
• If an employer offers an accommodation that is deemed reasonable, the 
employee must accept that accommodation.152   
•  
Alternatively, a lactation-related amendment could require that the employer 
accept and implement any reasonable accommodation made by the employee, unless 
that accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer.153  Either 
way, a breastfeeding-related amendment that includes a reasonable accommodation 
provision would balance both employer and employee needs.    
VIII.  THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF TITLE VII AND THE PDA ON WORKPLACE POLICIES 
AND PROCEDURES:  WHAT EQUAL TREATMENT MEANS TODAY 
The face of the workforce has changed, remarkably and undeniably, since the 
passage of federal and state legislation promising equal workplace opportunity to 
women.  Much has been made about the workplace choices now available to women.  
Indeed, today, “from the very first stages of their professional careers, men are 
working side-by-side with an equal number of female peers.”154 
Much has also been made about the fact that, despite new doors being opened, 
many women still choose to leave the workforce to care for their families.  Hence, 
the modern evolution of women’s workplace struggles is now less about admission 
into the workplace, and more about long-term acceptance and retention.  More 
specifically, a woman who chooses to have children may find that that choice 
preempts her ability to also choose to have a meaningful career.  By and large, the 
modern workplace paradigm is simply not designed to accommodate a working 
mother’s inevitable need for flexible work-life balance.155  Further, there is evidence 
to suggest that stereotypical perceptions about working mothers negatively impact 
their workplace opportunities for career advancement.   
Although the law requires employers to open their doors to women, the ultimate 
goal underlying Title VII is true inclusion.  Nevertheless, stereotypes and implicit 
assumptions about “a woman’s place” remain.  The simple fact is that women remain 
                                                                
152See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986) (holding that an employee’s 
dissatisfaction with the accommodation provided by an employer is irrelevant so long as that 
accommodation is found to be “reasonable”).    
153See id.   
154HOLLY ENGLISH, GENDER ON TRIAL: SEXUAL STEREOTYPES AND WORK/LIFE BALANCE IN 
THE LEGAL WORKPLACE  (ALM Publishing 2003). 
155Indeed, there seems to be some correlation between motherhood and receipt of a smaller 
salary than male colleagues.  “Sociological studies show that motherhood accounts for an 
increasing proportion of the wage gap between men and women.  While the wages of young 
women . . . are close to those of men, mothers’ wages are only sixty percent of those of 
fathers.”  Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family 
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 77-78 
(2003) [hereinafter Williams & Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall]..  This means that a female 
employee who has children can expect to earn less than her male co-workers. The salary of a 
male employee with children, however, is not similarly impaired. Id.    
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the primary home and family caretakers, and this role continues to limit women’s 
ultimate career advancement.  Does this mean that women must either choose a 
career or a family?  Is there nothing else, legislatively or otherwise, that can be done 
to retain female employees who desire a family and a career?  As a practical matter, 
what, then, is the modern manifestation of equal treatment in the workplace?   
A.  “The Maternal Wall”:  Women’s Workplace Advancement Stymied by Family 
Caretaker Roles 
We all know about the glass ceiling. But many women never get near it; they are 
stopped long before by the maternal wall. 156 
It is no secret that women today struggle to balance workplace and family 
obligations.  By and large, women either choose or are expected to act as their 
families’ primary caretaker and, despite social strides, women’s prospects for career 
advancement remain inevitably limited by that role.157  Indeed, the debate about 
whether women should work and/or adopt a full-time homemaker position is often 
presented in tandem with a more modern question:  can women really have it all?    
1.  Popular Discourse Regarding Work–Family Balance in the 1970s and 80s 
During the 1970s and 1980s, popular discourse largely focused on common 
notions regarding a woman’s proper place and role in society, such as whether 
women were physically and mentally capable of performing jobs as well as their 
male counterparts.  Also debated was whether female entry into the workplace would 
signal the end of healthy American families.   
For example, in the 1980s, certain media stories openly questioned whether 
working women were properly caring for their children.  Along the same lines, news 
stories raised questions about whether mothers who placed their children in daycare 
exposed their children to likely harm.  “The anti–day care headlines practically 
shrieked in the 80s: ‘Mommy, don’t leave me here!’  ‘The day care parents don’t 
see.’  ‘Day care can be dangerous to your child’s health.’  ‘When child care becomes 
child molesting: it happens more often than parents like to think.’”158  Such stories 
presented accounts of day care abuse, cited studies that children in daycare were sick 
more often and warned that placing children in daycare “diminished bonds between 
mother and child.”159  
                                                                
156See Williams & Segal, supra note 153, at 77.   
157See Laura D’Andrea Tyson, What Larry Summers Got Right, Bus. Wk., March 28, 
2005.  “Specifically, women perform about eighty percent of the childcare for their families 
and, as a result, over ninety percent of mothers cannot do the type of overtime required by the 
best jobs.”  Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work-Family Conflict: Developing a Model of Parental 
Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM.U.L. REV. 305, 313 (December 2004) (Despite the 
fact that the education gap between women and men has all but disappeared, women in most 
families are still expected to shoulder the lion’s share of caring for children, for elderly 
parents, and for spouses.) NEED CITE. 
158FALUDI, supra note 15, at 41–42. 
159
 Id. at 43.  Less frequent were the stories portraying the positive effects of placing 
children in day care. For example,“[R]esearch over the last two decades has consistently found 
that if daycare has any long-term effect on children, it seems to make children slightly more 
gregarious and independent.”  Id. 
2009] PREGNANT EMPLOYEES, WORKING MOTHERS 229 
Such social messages villainized working mothers who “abandon[ed]” their 
children to pursue a career.160  Advocates of stay-at-home parenting had even gone 
so far as to suggest that the morality of the entire country was at stake.  President 
Theodore Roosevelt, for example, once stated that “[i]f the mother does not do her 
duty, there will either be no next generation, or a next generation that is worse than 
none at all.”161  More recently, one of President Reagan’s “top military officials 
proclaimed, ‘American mothers who work and send their children to faceless centers 
rather than stay home to take of them are weakening the moral fiber of the 
nation.’”162 
Other media messages simply portrayed women’s desire for work-family balance 
as an impossibility.  For example, a 1986 Newsweek cover story essentially 
concluded that women could not successfully balance their career and family 
obligations.  The article opened with the following anecdote: 
Colleen Murphy Walter had it all.  An executive at a Chicago hospital, she 
earned more than $50,000 a year and had two sons . . . But there was a 
price. Late at night, when everyone else was sleeping, she would be 
awake, desperately trying to figure out how to survive “this tangle of a 
lifestyle.”  Six months ago, Walter, thirty-six, quit, to stay home and raise 
her children.  “Trying to be the best mother and the best worker was an 
emotional strain,” she says. “I wanted to further myself in the corporate 
world.  But suddenly I got tired and realized I just couldn’t do it 
anymore.”163 
Far from proposing solutions to “make it work,” the article concluded with a dire 
prediction:  “’Today the myth of Supermom is fading fast — doomed by anger, guilt 
and exhaustion’. . . ‘An increasing number’ of mothers are working at home and ‘a 
growing number’ of mothers have reached ‘the recognition that they can’t have it 
all.’”164   
                                                                
160See generally id.  One study even suggested that employment adversely affects a 
woman’s health.   As The Type E Woman advised, “Working women are swelling the 
epidemiological ranks of ulcer cases, drug and alcohol abuse, depression, sexual dysfunction 
and a score of stress-induced psychological ailments, including backache, headache, allergies, 
and recurrent viral infections and flu.”  Id. at 38. Other experts added to this list heart attacks, 
strokes, hypertension, nervous breakdowns, suicides, and cancer. “Women are freeing 
themselves up to die like men,” asserted Dr. James Lynch.  Id. at 38. 
161Id. at 263–64. 
162FALUDI, supra note 15, at 42.  Faludi takes issue with the messages bestowed by the 
media, noting its ability to “shap[e] the way people would think and talk about the feminist 
legacy and the ailment it supposedly inflicted on women.  It coined the terms that everyone 
used: ‘the man shortage,’ ‘the biological clock,’ ‘the mommy track’ and ‘post feminism.’”  Id. 
at 77.  Faludi further criticizes the negative attention the media focused on women’s struggles 
to balance work and family responsibilities: “the press was the first to set forth and solve for a 
mainstream audience the paradox in women’s lives . . . women have achieved so much yet feel 
so dissatisfied; it must be feminism’s achievements, not society’s resistance to these partial 
achievements, that is causing women all the pain.”  Id. 
163Id. at 89–90. 
164Id. at 90 (emphasis added).   
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There are many examples of working women today who do appear to “have it 
all,” or at least, are able to somehow juggle family obligations with successful 
careers.  Tina Fey and Sarah Palin are two recent examples of such women.  But 
even among high profile, successful family women, remnants of Newsweek’s dire 
proselytizations still linger.  Take for example, Tina Fey, who gave birth to a 
daughter in the fall of 2005, while working full time as the head writer for Saturday 
Night Live.165  Ms. Fey returned to work only 43 days after giving birth.166  “I had to 
get back to work,” she said at the time.  “NBC has me under contract; the baby and I 
only have a verbal agreement.” 167 
In a recent interview with Parade Magazine, Ms. Fey offers her own take about 
being a part of the “have it all” generation:  “I think my generation has been slightly 
tricked in that you’re really encouraged to try to have it all.  And sometimes your 
body will not let you wait as long as you want.”168  Ms. Fey goes on to describe 
“tears involved at home occasionally –– just occasionally.”169  “The life of the 
working parent,” she says, “is constantly saying, ‘This is impossible,’ and then you 
just keep doing it.”170 
2.  Modern Discourse Regarding Work–Family Balance: Discrimination Versus 
Choice and “the Opt-Out Hypothesis” 
As feminist theorist Christine Littleton has pointed out: “what makes pregnancy 
a disability rather than, say, an additional ability, is the structure of work, not 
reproduction.”171 
As women have increased their presence in the workforce and expanded their 
career ambitions beyond traditional confines,172 the central debate has shifted focus.  
The doors have largely been open, but it cannot be denied that women are still failing 
to realize the same workplace opportunities as men.   Why?  Consider, for example, 
the following statistics:   
                                                                
165James Kaplan, Making it Work, PARADE MAGAZINE, Mar. 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.parade.com/articles/editions/2008/edition_03-09-2008/1Tina_Fey.  For an 
interesting article on women in comedy, see also Alessandra Stanley, Who Says Women Aren’t 
Funny, VANITY FAIR (April 2008), available at http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/ 
2008/04/funnygirls200804. 
166Kaplan, supra note 163.   
167Id.  
168Id.  
169Id.  
170Id.     
171Gloria Steinem, Revaluing Economics, in MOVING BEYOND WORDS 221 (Simon & 
Schuster 1994) (quoting Christine A. Littleton, Restructuring Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 
1279 (1987)). 
172The type of work done by women has likewise experienced only limited diversification.  
“While women have more job options than they did in 1964, they continue to be concentrated 
in certain industries and traditionally female jobs.  The top five occupations for women in 
2003 were secretaries and administrative assistances (96.3% female), elementary and middle 
school teachers (80.6%), registered nurses (90.2%), nursing psychiatric, and home health aides 
(89%), and cashiers (75.5%).”  Women at Work, supra note 36 (citation omitted).  
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• “[A]ccording to a recent U.S. survey, 1 in 3 women with an MBA is not 
working full-time, vs. 1 in 20 men with the same degree.”173   
• “Today many companies are recruiting female MBA graduates in nearly 
equal numbers to male MBA grads, but they’re finding that a substantial 
percentage of their female recruits drop out within three to five years.” 
174
   
• In the legal profession, the number of female partners in mid- to large-
sized firms has not experienced growth proportional to the steady 
increase in female law school graduates since the 1980s.175   
• Indeed, “[w]omen flee law firms in much larger numbers than do men.  
As [one] survey found, the attrition rate for women each year was three 
to seven percentage points higher than for their male counterparts, and 
was most evident in the sixth through eighth years following law 
school.” 176  
• Instead, there is a clear tendency for women to “disappear” along the 
partnership track.  Indeed, as of 2002:  “men constituted 70% of 
practitioners, still the great majority. They are even more 
overwhelmingly the leaders. Eighty-five percent of firm partners, 95% 
of managing partners” are men. 177 
• Moreover, approximately “88% of general counsel in Fortune 500 
companies are male.” 178 
• Approximately “[t]hree-quarters of federal judges and 80% of state 
supreme court justices are men.”179 
 
The fact remains that men continue to outnumber women by a sizeable margin in 
the upper echelons of the corporate and business worlds.180  It cannot be denied that 
the top tier of the corporate and professional worlds remains in the near exclusive 
control of men.181  Thus, even with the 40-year-old equal-opportunity mandate of 
Title VII, the gender composition of the highest-ranking professional boardrooms 
remains strikingly unchanged.  It appears that the modern problem for employers is 
not finding female talent –– it is retaining and promoting female talent.182      
                                                                
173Tyson, supra note 155. 
174Id.  
175See ENGLISH, supra note 152, at 4. 
176Id.   
177
 Id. 
178Id. 
179Id. 
180See id. 
181See Tyson, supra note 155. 
182Id. (“The vexing problem for businesses [and employers] is not finding female talent 
but retaining it.”).  Still, the majority of women are employed today.  “In 2003,” for example, 
women comprised forty-seven percent of the total labor force, with a labor force participation 
rate of 59.5 percent (meaning that 59.5 percent of women, sixteen years of age or older, were 
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To some, women disappear from the workplace because they “are unwilling” to 
put in the time required to develop their careers.  This, for example, was the opinion 
professed by Lawrence H. Summers, president of Harvard University, who “argued 
that top leadership positions in academia, business, and law require a time 
commitment that many women are unwilling to make.”183   
This notion that women choose not to put the time into their careers that 
advancement requires is sometimes referred to as the “opt-out hypothesis.”  In 
particular, the opt-out hypothesis holds that women simply choose –– freely and 
willingly –– to devote their time to their families, rather than work, regardless of, for 
example, the time that they spent educating themselves to achieve professional 
careers.  In this regard, the opt-out hypothesis is cited as an explanation for why so 
few women with advanced degrees continue to work after obtaining that degree.184   
It is clear that pressure placed upon women (by themselves? by society? by their 
families?) to choose between family and career has not decreased much over the 
decades.  For example: 
In 1990, a poll of working women by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman found 
almost 30 percent of [working women] believed that ‘wanting to put more 
energy into being a good homemaker and mother’ was cause to consider 
quitting work altogether — an 11 percent increase from just a year earlier 
and the highest proportion in two decades.185 
Also, in a March 28, 2005, Business Week article, Laura Tyson noted the 
prevalence of the opt-out phenomenon among women with graduate, professional, or 
high honors undergraduate degrees:  “some 37% of the women surveyed — and 43% 
of those with kids — voluntarily left work at some point in their careers, with the 
average break lasting about two years.”186  Of these women, 44% “cited family 
responsibilities as the reason for their leaving.”187  Only 24% percent of men, by 
contrast “took time off from their careers, with no statistical difference between 
those who were fathers and those who were not,” and only 12% of those men left for 
                                                          
either working or looking for work).  Women at Work, supra note 36. At the end of 2002, 
close to sixty percent of American women had a job. Sharon Rabin Margalioth, Women, 
Careers, Babies:  An Issue of Time or Timing, 13 UCLA WOM. L.J. 293, 299 (2005) (citing 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2003 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 387 tbl.591, 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/03statab/labor (last visited Jan. 10, 2005)).  “By the 
year 2002, 59.4% of all women in the United States were employed.”  Id.  
183Tyson, supra note 155 (emphasis added); see also Marcella Bombardieri, Harvard 
Women’s Group Rips Summers, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 19, 2005, at A1, available at 
http://boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2005/01/19/harvard_womens_group_rips_su
mmers/.  
184See Tyson, supra note 155.  
185FALUDI, supra note 15, at 81. 
186Tyson, supra note 155. 
187Id. 
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family reasons.188  Instead, “[a]mong men, who averaged about one year off, the 
primary reason was career enhancement.”189 
It is misleading, however, to discuss women’s abandonment of their careers as a 
“choice,” without taking a closer look at the forces driving that choice.  More to the 
point, it seems that women, more so than men, continue to feel the most pressure to 
perform on the home front.  Assuming that women also want to pursue successful 
careers, whose responsibility is it to help them in that regard?  To answer that 
question, the potential for internal sources of limitation (a woman’s own career 
expectations) must be considered in connection with influential external sources 
(social messages, legislation and workplace terms and conditions of employment). 
3.  Redefining the Workplace Paradigm:  Workplace Policies, Reinforcing Mother-
Friendly Workplace Discourse and Implementing Fair Evaluation of Female 
Employees  
Designing workplace objectives around an ideal worker who has a man’s body 
and men’s traditional immunity from family caregiving discriminates against 
women.  Eliminating that ideal is not “accommodation;” it is the minimum 
requirement for gender equality.190 
The ability to retain female talent requires more than simply breaking down the 
barriers that may prevent workforce entry and acclimation.  The simple reality is 
that, although federal legislation such as Title VII and the PDA opened the door to 
female entry into the workforce, the retention of female workers and their ability to 
advance their careers is influenced by factors beyond legislative control.   
Some measures of self-regulation have already been taken by employers.  By 
enacting policies more accommodating to working mothers, employers at least 
appear to have become more sensitive to their employees’ family caregiving needs.  
Flex-time and job-sharing programs are two examples of flexible work arrangements 
designed to help employees balance their work and family responsibilities.   
What remains unclear, however, is whether employers that provide flex-time and 
job-sharing accommodations hold employees who take advantage of these policies in 
                                                                
188Id. 
189Id.   Of course, some women who take time off to care for their families may not realize 
how difficult it is to re-enter the workforce.  Difficulty finding a job after several years off 
may cause a woman to resignedly accept her position as full-time homemaker and mom, 
despite earlier ambitions to the contrary:   
[Ninety-three percent] of the women who took time off from work wanted to return to 
their careers, despite the painful work-life tradeoffs required.  Unfortunately, only 74% of 
those were able to do so, with 40% returning to full-time professional jobs and 24% taking 
part-time positions.  And even those who returned to the workforce lost substantial earning 
power, with the penalties becoming more severe the longer the break.  Overall, women who 
took time out from careers lost an average of 18% of their earning power; in business careers, 
the average loss was 28% even though the average break lasted little more than a year.  
Accordingly, recent studies show that “a large percentage of . . . highly qualified women do 
indeed choose to take time off from their careers, and they pay a huge price in terms of future 
job opportunities and financial rewards to do so.” 
Tyson, supra note 155. 
190Williams & Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall, supra note 153, at 80].  
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high esteem.  Some believe that employees who work reduced hours are not as 
financially valuable to employers.  Those critical of the mommy track and similar 
family-friendly flexible work arrangements characterize these programs as an 
expensive accommodation.  According to Yale Law School professor Christine Jolls, 
for example, “antidiscrimination law fairly obviously operates to require employers 
to incur undeniable financial costs associated with employing the disfavored group 
of employees — and thus in a real sense to ‘accommodate’ these employees.”191    
Those in support of flex-time and job-sharing policies, by contrast, argue that 
“the impression that family-friendly policies are expensive may be inaccurate once 
the long-term costs of doing business in a family-hostile atmosphere are taken into 
account.”192  “Family-responsive policies hold the promise to save money by 
decreasing the costs associated with attrition, absenteeism, recruiting, quality control, 
and productivity.”193   
In law firms, for example, studies show that “replacing an experienced law firm 
associate is estimated to cost between $200,000 and $500,000 per year.”194  In this 
regard, it would seem most cost-effective to enact policies more flexible to working 
mothers’ needs, rather that incur expensive replacement costs.  Moreover, the 
perception that a law firm is hostile towards working mothers could inflict damage 
upon that firm’s reputation –– and a damaged reputation is likely to translate into 
very real costs, such as a decreased client base, low morale among workers, and an 
inability to attract well–qualified employees overall.195  
On the other hand, can’t every woman who needs to leave work early to care for 
her family be replaced by a man who is willing to work late?  Isn’t that an issue of 
work productivity, and not gender?  From an employer perspective, do policies 
sensitive to the needs of working mothers ultimately translate into real value?  After 
all, so long as there remain lawyers willing to spend their days, nights and weekends 
sitting at a desk billing hours to earn money for their employers, do working mothers 
really stand a chance?  Are law firms simply not a viable career option in that 
regard? 
Regardless of (or perhaps because of) their perceived value, the reality is that 
flexible work arrangements have, as of yet, failed to remedy the barriers to career 
advancement facing women with children:  
                                                                
191Id. at 85 (criticizing the “accommodation is costly” assumption made by other scholars).  
Id. at 86–87 (quoting Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 642, 645 (2001)). 
192Id. at 87 (quoting Ernst & Young partner Alison Hooker, and citing JOAN WILLIAMS, 
UNBENDING GENDER: WHY WORK AND FAMILY CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 64–114 
(2000)). 
193Id. at 88 (citing Joan Williams & Cynthia Calvert, THE PROJECT FOR ATTORNEY 
RETENTION, BALANCED HOURS: EFFECTIVE PART-TIME POLICIES FOR WASHINGTON LAW FIRMS, 
at 7–12 (2d ed. 2001)). 
194Id.   
195See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 155, at 323 (“By failing to accommodate working 
parents, employers are . . . limiting their pool of potential employees, and particularly 
employees with certain qualities and skills.”). 
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Across the country, female managers and professionals with young 
families are leaving the fast track for the mommy track,’ Business Week 
proclaimed in a cover story.”  There was speculation that “the majority of 
women [‘career-and-family’ women] . . . were willing and satisfied to 
give up higher pay and promotions. Corporations should . . . treat these 
women different from ‘career-primary’ women, allotting them fewer 
hours, bonuses, and opportunities for advancement.196 
Is this true?  Do women choose to abandon promising careers by choice –– or is 
it because they believe they have no choice, because working mothers are perceived 
as less valuable than those without family obligations?  Consider the following, 
which articulates a popular sentiment expressed by some:    
[W]omen who did not have problems at work before having children may find 
their competence questioned after they become mothers.  For example, a lawyer 
found that once she announced her pregnancy, she began to encounter negative 
performance evaluations and other problems.  Another lawyer, given the work of a 
paralegal upon her return from maternity leave, reported that she wanted to say, ‘I 
had a baby, not a lobotomy;’ she had ceased to be perceived as a high-competence 
business woman once she became a mother.197 
Indeed, in an article published in the Harvard Women’s Law Journal, Joan C. 
Williams & Nancy Segal discussed the impact of stereotypes on working mothers’ 
perceived value as employees: 198     
• Memory and Perception: “‘Once stereotypes take hold, other 
information inconsistent with the stereotype is ignored or excluded.’  
Thus, an employer or co-workers may notice every time a mother leaves 
work early, but forget those instances when [she] leave[s] late.” 
• Interpretation of Ambiguous Events: “For example, in a training 
hypothetical developed by Deloitte & Touche, when two parents arrived 
late for an early morning meeting, their co-workers assumed that the 
woman, but not the man, was having childcare problems (although, in 
fact, the man was having childcare problems while the woman’s train 
was late).”  This may further result in a “difference in attribution: the 
man’s absence is coded as unimportant because ‘it happens to 
everyone,’ whereas the woman’s absence is coded as further proof she 
has fallen from go-getter ‘businesswoman’ to ‘lost her edge’ 
housewife.” 
• Inference: “For example, even today, women are sometimes advised to 
remove their wedding rings when they interview for employment, 
presumably to avoid the inference that they will have children and not 
be serious about their careers.”199 
 
                                                                
196FALUDI, supra note 15, at 91 (internal quotations omitted). 
197Williams & Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall, supra note 153, at 91. 
198Id. at 96 (quoting Jane A. Halpert, Midge L. Wilson & Julia Hickman, Pregnancy as a 
Source of Bias in Performance Evaluations, 14 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 649, 650 (1993)). 
199Id. at 97 (citations omitted). 
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Studies also suggest that the diminished physical presence of part-time 
employees correlates to decreased employer esteem.200  Put simply –– face time 
counts.  The fact that employers tend to associate long hours at the office with 
dedication and commitment may inevitably lead them to discount the value of 
women who work part-time.  Employer impressions of the personality traits of such 
part-time workers may also suffer from a belief that such employees lack the ideal 
traits of prized employees –– ambition and drive:201 
Of particular interest is a study analyzing pregnancy as a source of bias in 
performance evaluations.  This study found that performance reviews by 
managers plummeted after pregnancy.  Because pregnancy tends to trigger 
the most traditional feminine stereotypes [‘submissive, dependent, 
selfless, nurturing, tidy, gentle, and unconfident’], researchers found not 
only that performance appraisals of pregnant women plummet, but that 
the women also report negative attitudes and behaviors by co-workers.202 
Such findings “provide insight as to why, given the business case for family-friendly 
policies, many employers have been unable to implement such policies effectively.  
Often, even well-intentioned attempts to shift toward a new workplace paradigm 
may be subverted by unexamined gender stereotypes.”203 
In addition to negative performance assessments by their managers, many 
mothers who work part-time report experiences with co-workers that border on 
hostility.  One study, reporting on the stereotypes, found that “women employed 
part-time are viewed more similar to homemakers than to women employed full 
time.  Part-timers, they found, are viewed as low in agency: ‘Women who are 
employed part-time are probably thought to have homemaker as their primary 
occupational role,’ the authors concluded.”204  Other employees may believe that, 
once an employee has a young child, she is no longer pulling her weight at the office.  
Thus, working part-time may ultimately distinguish and isolate a working mother 
from her peers.  
The mommy track and flexible-work arrangements remain largely in early, 
experimental stages for most employers and, for the most part, their promise of 
career advancement while working part-time has yet to be fulfilled.  What will the 
future workforce look like?  How will market forces further encourage –– or stifle –– 
the implementation of new, innovative work arrangements to better accommodate 
work-life balance?  We shall see. 
                                                                
200Id. at 93. 
201Id. (citing Lottie Bailyn, BREAKING THE MOLD, at 105–15 (1993); Rhoda Rapoport et 
al., BEYOND WORK-FAMILY BALANCE: ADVANCING GENDER EQUITY AND WORKPLACE 
PERFORMANCE 38 (2001)). 
202Williams & Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall, supra note 153, at 93  (citing Madeline 
E. Heilman, Sex Stereotypes and Their Effects in the Workplace: What We Know and What We 
Don’t Know, 10 GENDER IN THE WORKPLACE: A SPECIAL ISSUE OF J. SOC. BEHAV. & 
PERSONALITY,  6–7 (1995)). 
203Williams & Segal, supra note 153, at 94. 
204Id. at 91 (citing Alice H. Eagly & Valerie J. Steffen, Gender Stereotypes, Occupational 
Roles, and Beliefs about Part-Time Employees, 10 PSYCH. OF WOMEN Q. 252, 254 (1986)). 
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B.  Why Do So Many Women Conclude That They Cannot Balance Family and 
Career Responsibilities (And Therefore Abandon Their Careers)? 
To the extent that debates regarding women’s rights are popularly entertained 
today, those debates primarily focus on issues of family.  Today, the difficult 
struggles faced by women who seek to balance careers with family obligations is a 
popular media theme, and the underlying message is clear:  Women, you cannot 
really have it all — or perhaps you no longer want it all.205  That message no longer 
encourages women to shatter the glass ceiling, but instead tells women that they 
must acknowledge their limitations and make a choice:  family or career.206 
However, it cannot be denied that the issue of female retention and career choice 
remains closely related to issues regarding family care.  In particular, women remain 
the primary family caretakers.207  The “pervasiveness of the traditional division of 
labor within families” remains.  “Despite the fact that the education gap between 
women and men has all but disappeared, women in most families are still expected to 
shoulder the lion’s share of caring for children, for elderly parents, and for 
spouses.”208 
Today, the pregnancy/parenting debate also focuses on whether employers have a 
responsibility — moral, legal, or otherwise — to accommodate employees’ needs 
with regard to their children.209  In addition to practices that actively seek to 
incorporate women in the workplace, employers should be wary of policies that 
further exclude women, albeit inadvertently.  “[D]iscrimination today rarely operates 
in isolated states of mind; rather, it is often influenced, enabled, even encouraged by 
structures, practices, and opportunities of the organizations within which groups and 
individuals work.”210   
For example, playing a large role in this debate are unspoken expectations with 
regard to the importance of workplace face-time.  “[M]any employers measure 
worker quality time by ‘face time’ even when no clear correlation between hours at 
the job and productivity exists.  This focus on ‘face time’ discriminates against 
employees with childcare responsibilities and ignores the fact that employers may 
actually improve their bottom line when they accommodate working parents.”211  
                                                                
205See, e.g., Gaby Hinsliff and Amelia Hill, Why the have-it-all woman has decided she 
doesn’t want it all (Nov. 27, 2005), http://observer.guardian.co.uk/politics/story/0,6903, 
1651808,00.html (“The myth of the superwoman ‘having it all,’ juggling a stellar career and 
children with breezy efficiency, has given working mothers inferiority complexes for 
decades. . . . But now, the Having It All generation are giving way to the Actually, I Don’t 
Want It All - or at least, Not All At The Same Time generation.”). 
206See Sharon Rabin Margalioth, Women, Careers, Babies: An Issue Of Time Or Timing?, 
13 UCLA WOM. L.J. 293 (Spring 2005).  “It seems that women are still confronted with the 
cruel choice of either having a career or a family life.”  Id. 
207Id. 
208Id. 
209See Williams & Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall, supra note 153, at 82. 
210Tristen K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural 
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 128 (2003). 
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Ultimately, women may simply decide that, if they must choose between family and 
workplace face-time, their family relationships are simply more valuable to them 
than their careers. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
Legislative history accompanying passage of the PDA provided that “[t]he entire 
thrust . . . behind [that] legislation [was] to guarantee women the basic right to 
participate fully and equally in the workforce, without denying them the fundamental 
right to full participation in family life.”212  Perhaps the promise of “full 
participation” in both the workplace and family life was too ambitious a promise for 
Congress to make.  By all accounts, in the 30 years since passage of the PDA, 
women have found it difficult, if not impossible, to completely balance their 
childcare responsibilities with a demanding career.   
This is not to say, however, that important progress has not been made.  
Legislation, such as the PDA and Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112, and 
interpretative case law have played an important role in defining what it means to 
provide equal treatment to pregnant employees.  More, however, can be done in this 
regard, particularly with regard to new mothers’ breastfeeding-related needs.   
Further, constant evaluation of employer and employee needs, including 
workplace perceptions and policies, is necessary to promote female career 
advancement.  Modern wisdom holds that, by enabling women to better balance 
work-family concerns, employers increase their chances of retaining top female 
talent, and many employers have enacted family-friendly workplace policies in this 
regard.213  Nonetheless, “top female talent” may necessarily exclude women who fail 
to demonstrate their willingness or ability to place their employers’ needs before 
their own.  A proper work-life balance, therefore, must be one that takes into account 
both the employer’s realistic workplace productivity expectations and the 
employee’s desire to develop and maintain healthy family relationships away from 
the office.   
Employees must have realistic job expectations.  Some jobs allow for more free 
time (and/or family time) than others.  A law firm with a billable hour requirement, 
for example, measures each lawyer’s value by the amount of money that lawyer 
brings in to the firm.  Money is earned by billable hours worked, and an employee 
who works part-time, by definition, is only partially profitable.  Moreover, clients 
who expect their lawyer to be accessible at all times may shy away from those 
attorneys who are only available three out of seven days a week.  So long as there are 
employees willing to sit at their desks all day, every day, market forces and client 
needs will inevitably slow employer acceptance of a working mother’s desire for 
flexible hours.    
But the employer must form realistic workplace expectations as well.  For 
example, modern advances in technology make it possible and very feasible for some 
work to be done away from the office and at home.  Employers who still cling to a 
belief that “face time” translates into career dedication may unwittingly isolate 
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working mothers eager to devote themselves to their careers, but not necessarily to 
their desks, full-time.    
Further, “[l]aw firm models that emphasize profits over culture harm attorney 
retention,” and “chip away at cohesiveness.”214  For example, according to a female 
partner now practicing employment law at a large international firm, “[w]hen you let 
go of that culture and manage only by profits by partner, there is no glue to hold 
people together.”215  “You’ve got to have trust between partner and partner, and 
partner and associate, and between clients and law firms.”216  Thus, in the end, a 
churn and burn business model may sacrifice the trust and cohesion essential to long-
term law firm success. 
Ultimately, although pregnancy remains a condition unique to women, there 
remains the simple proposition that childcare and household labor can, and should, 
be evenly divided between husband and wife.  Husbands and fathers could offer to 
stay home with the children more, since presumably both parties made the decision 
to reproduce.  Indeed, perhaps the most straightforward way to reduce the post-
pregnancy family caretaking burden upon working women is for that burden to be 
shared.  Perhaps, therefore, a woman who wants it all — a career and a family — 
must accept some personal responsibility to negotiate with her family in this regard.  
Indeed, it is not that women cannot have it all.  It is that women cannot do it alone.   
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